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RECENT CASES
Bankruptcy-Recording of Lien within Four Month Period as
Preference-Where creditor, within four months of debtor's bankruptcy and knowing of debtor's insolvency, recorded bills of sale executed
by debtor some time before to secure an indebtedness simultaneously created, it was held that such recordation was not a voidable preference
within section 6o of the Chandler Act.' Adams v. City Bank & Trust Co.,
115 F. (2d) 453 (C. C. A. 5th, 194o).
Prior to the passage of the Chandler Act, the Supreme Court of the
United States had held that an encumbrance placed on the debtor's property to secure an indebtedness simultaneously created was not a preference
even though recorded at a later date within four months of bankruptcy
by the creditor knowing of the debtor's insolvency. 2 It has been stated
by the draftsmen of the Chandler Act that the purpose of the new section4
6o 3 is to change the effect of this holding by abolishing all secret liens.
The abolition of such liens is to be achieved, under section 6o, by deferring
the running of the four month period until such time as the lien is made
notorious, i. e., is perfected, by recording or any other means, against
attack by creditors of or bona fide purchasers from the debtor.- Stated
another way, the transfer is deemed to have been made at the date when
the lien is perfected rather than at the time when it was created. Consequently, when the lien is recorded at some time after the giving of the consideration it would seem that there has then been a transfer on account
of an antecedent debt." This reasoning, rejected by the court in the
i. "A preference is a transfer .
.
[by] . . . debtor while insolvent
for the benefit of a creditor for or on account of an antecedent debt, made . . . by
debtor while insolvent and within four months . . . of . . . bankruptcy.
(A) . . . transfer shall be deemed to have been made at the time when it became so far perfected that no bona-fide purchaser from the debtor and no creditor
could thereafter have acquired any rights in the property so transferred superior to the
rights of the transferee therein.... ".52 STAT. 869 (1938), II U. S. C. A. § 96a
(Supp. 1939).
2. Martin v. Commercial National Bank, 245 U. S. 513 (1918) ; Carey v. Donohue,
240 U. S. 430 (1916) ; Bailey v. Baker Ice Machine Co., 239 U. S. 269 (1915). However, some of the lower federal courts have held such liens void in cases not substantially distinguishable from those just cited. John Hetherington & Sons, Ltd. v. Rudisill, 28 F. (2d) 713 (C. C. A. 4th, 1928) ; In re Loeb's, Inc., 279 Fed. 269 (N. D. Miss.
1922).

Where the lien was intentionally withheld from record for the purpose of preserving the debtor's credit, the law is well settled that such lien is voidable. Cooper
Grocery Co. v. Penland, 247 Fed. 480 (C. C. A. 5th, 1917) ; Manders v. Wilson, 235
Fed. 878 (C. C. A. 9th, 1916) ; see Rankin v. Cox, 71 F. (2d) 56, 59 (C. C. A. 8th,
1934).

3. See note i supra.
4. "The intention to defeat transfers such as that in the Martin case seems clear."
McLaughlin, Aspects of the Chandler Bill to Amend the Bankruptcy Act (1937) 4 U.
OF CHI. L. REv. 369, 392. "The purpose of this provision was to strike down secret
transfers.... ." WEINsTIN, THE BANKRUPTcy LAW OF 1938, iv, 120. To the same
effect see Mulder, Ambiguities in the Chandler Act (194o) 89 U. OF PA. L. REv. IO,
22.

5. Under § 6o, as it existed prior to the Chandler Act, the running of the four
month period was deferred until the date of recording only when recording was required. 30 STAT. 562 (1898), as amended, 32 STAT. 799 (1903), as amended, 36 STAT.
842 (igio), ii U. S. C. A. §96 (1927). Cases decided on the basis of this section
often turned on the question of the definition of "required". See cases collected in II
U. S. C. A. § 96, n. i11 (1927).
6. See Matter of Aughenbaugh, 33 F. Supp. 671, 672 (M. D. Pa. 194o). Mulder,
supra note 4, at 23.
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instant case,7 represents a broad extension of the bankruptcy doctrine of
past indebtedness," and when pursued to its logical conclusion may pro-

duce unconscionable hardship. 9 Thus any delay by a creditor in recording
his lien will result in its destruction if bankruptcy supervenes within four
months, no matter how small or excusable the delay and regardless of the
fact that he gave value for the lien. 10 To temper the harshness latent in
the new section 6o courts might do well to expand or restrict their definition of "antecedent debt" to accommodate the equities of each case."
This seems to have been the procedure followed in the instant case.

Conflict of Laws-Priority of Statutory Tax Lien over Foreign
Chattel Mortgage Lien-Mortgagor gave plaintiff, a bank domiciled in
Nebraska, a promissory note secured by a mortgage on cattle located in
Nebraska. Without plaintiff's knowledge,' the cattle were removed to
South Dakota where they were seized by defendant sheriff in lieu of the
mortgagor's unpaid personal property tax. The tax had been assessed on
other chattels which the mortgagor had removed from South Dakota before
the tax claim had been satisfied.2 Plaintiff brought an action to recover
possession of the cattle. Held, the local statute 3 giving tax liens priority
over mortgage liens,4 should be applied to subject foreign mortgagee's interest to the tax lien. FirstNationalBank of Valentine, Neb. v. Peterson, 293
N. W. 530 (S. D. 194o).
7. Instant case at 454.
8. See cases collected in ii U. S. C. A. § 96, n. 135 (1927).
9. In the case of Friedman v. Sterling Refrigerator Co., lO4 F. (2d) 837 (C. C.
A. 4th, 1939) a conditional vendor's lien was avoided because the vendor was unable
to complete recordation until six days after the creation of the lien.
1o. In one case an attempt was made by the court to limit the destruction of the
lien to the extent that rights of other creditors intervened between its creation and recordation. On rehearing, however, the court decided that it was bound by the doctrine
of Moore v. Bay, 284 U. S. 4 (1931), and reluctantly set aside the entire lien. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Coller, io6 F. (2d) 584 (C. C. A. 6th, 1939). For
another case reaching the same result, see Friedman v. Sterling Refrigerator Co., 1O4
F. (2d) 837 (C. C. A. 4th, 1939).
ii. Some matters which might be considered in this connection are the length of

time during which the lien was left unrecorded, the reason for the delay in recording,
the existence or non-existence of intervening creditors, and the value of the consideration given for the lien.
I. See instant case at 531. The removal to South Dakota was in violation of the
express terms of the contract. It did not appear, however, how the cattle got there,
but the instant court seems to have accepted the premise that they were removed without the mortgagee's knowledge or consent. Id. at 532. Whether mortgagee consented
or not is by the better view immaterial. GooRIcH, CONFLICT OF LAws (2d ed. 1938)

§154.

2. Plaintiff questioned whether a tax lien attached to any personalty other than
that which was assessed. The wording of the statute and the settled decisions do not
so limit the tax lien as to personalty within the state. S. D. C. (1939) c. 57.0702,
§ 6759; J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co. v. Burtson, 57 S. D. 244, 231 N. W. 948
(1930) ; Minneapolis Threshing Machine Co. v. Roberts County, 34 S. D. 498, 149 N. W.
163 (1914). The instant court implied that whether the tax lien attached to the property involved was a question of ownership-that if mortgagee held title and not a mere
lien right, the tax would not have attached; but for the purposes of assessment, a court
is not required to take notice of divisions of interests. See General Motors Acceptance
Co. v. Whitfield, 62 S. D. 415,

418,

253 N. W. 450, 451 (1934).

Clearly, then, the

issue here is not one of assessment or attachability, but a question of priority.
3. S. D. C. (1939) c. 57.0702, § 6759.

4. A chattel mortgage in Nebraska gives mortgagee a lien-right. Appel Mercantile Co. v. Kirtland, 105 Neb. 494, 181 N. W. 151 (1920). See Jones, CHATTEL MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES (6th ed. 1933) § I, as to the diversity of holdings on
the question of whether a chattel mortgage gives mortgagee a lien, or whether thereby
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Where a mortgaged chattel is removed to a second state without the
knowledge or consent of foreign mortgagee, all but three jurisdictions 5
protect the interest of foreign mortgagee against local attaching creditors of
or bonafide purchasers from mortgagor., And it has been held not a
violation of the public policy of local recording statutes to protect foreign
mortgagees as well. 7 Where a mechanic's or materialmen's lien is expressly
given priority by local statute, the lien is usually held superior to a foreign
mortgagee's interest because of the value added to the chattel itself.8 By
analogy, if the tax lien had been created by an assessment on these cattle
after their removal to the second state, the tax lien might be given priority
in order to enforce the taxing power of the state.' But where, as in the
instant case, the tax claim existed before the cattle came into the second
state, the claim of the state for taxes should stand no higher than a claim
of an attaching creditor. 10 Nor would the power of the state to tax personalty within its jurisdiction be impaired by holding the instant statute inaptitle is vested in mortgagee. And under the rule of comity approved by the instant
court, mortgagee's lien right is recognized as such in South Dakota. Instant case at
531; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) § 265.
5. Younge v. Kipe, Phila. Leg. Int. July 9th, 194o, column 3; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (I935), PA. ANNOT. (1936) §268; MICH. ANNOy. (I937) §:268; TEX.
ANNOT. (1935) §268.
6. Shepard v. Hynes, io4 Fed. 449, 453 (C. C. A. 8th, igoo) ; General Motors Acceptance Co. v. Nuss, i96 So. 323 (La. Sup. Ct. 194o) ; Hart v. Oliver Farm Equipment Sales Co., 37 N. M. 267, 2r P. (2d) 96 (1933) ; 87 A. L. R. 962; 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935)
§§ 266, 268, 270, 271; Goodrich, loc. cit. supra note I;
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) § 268; ALA. ANNOT. (1939) § 268; CAL.
ANNOT. (1939) § 268; LA. ANNOT. (937)
§ 268; Mo. ANNOT. (937) § 268; Miss.
ANNOT. (935)
§ 268; MD. ANNOT. (1937) §268; N. Y. ANNOT. (1935) §268; OKLA.
ANNOT. (1937) §268; WASH. ANNOT. (1940) §268; W. VA. ANNOT. (937)
§ 268.
Beale poses the question whether this protection of the mortgagee or security holder
is a rule of common law or a rule of jurisdiction. Either way, the "title" or interest
of the mortgagee is protected. See I BEALE, op. cit. supra note I, § 50; 2 BEALE, op.
cit. supra note I, § 268; Beale, Jurisdiction over Title of Absent Owner in Chattel
(1927) 40 HARV. L. REv. 8o5.
7. Shepard v. Hynes, 104 Fed. 449, 453 (C. C. A. 8th, 19oo); General Motors
Acceptance Co. v. Nuss, 196 So. 323 (La. Sup. Ct. 194o) (An exhaustive survey and
collection of authorities on point. The decision also changes the law of Louisiana as
stated in RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (935), LA. ANNOr. (1937) §268);
National Bank of Commerce of Kansas City v. Morris, I14 Mo. 255, 21 S. W. 511
(1893); Hart v. Oliver Farm Equipment Sales Co., 37 N. M. 267, 21 P. (2d) 96
(1933) ; 87 A. L. R. 962. Contra: Turnbull v. Cole, 70 Colo. 364, 201 Pac. 887 (I921) ;
cf. Armitage-Herschell Co. v. Muscogee Real Estate Co., 119 Ga. 552, 46 S. E. 634
(1904) (Express statute requiring rerecordation) ; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS
(I935), ALA. ANNOT. (I939) § 268 (requiring rerecordation within 3o days).
8. Willy's Overland Co., 210 S. W. 565 (Tex. Civ. App. i919); Snyder v. Yates,
112 Tenn. 309, 79 S. W. 796 (I9O3); 2 BEALE, op. cit. supra note I, § 279.2 (stating
that the determinant is the value added) ; JONES, op. cit. supra note 4, § 474; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935)
§ 268; comment d; MD. ANNOT. (1937) § 268.
Where no value has been added to the chattel itself, Courts have with equal consistency
denied priority, Smith T. & S. Co. v. Reliable Co., 58 F. (2d) 511 (1932) (warehouseman's lien); Metzger v. Columbia Terminal Co., 227 Mo. App. 135, 50 S. W. (2d)
68o (1932) (carrier's lien). Alabama, however, holds that until the thirty days
allowed for recordation, the lien of the mortgagee shall be superior to all liens. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935), ALA. ANNOT. (1939) § 268. See for a general discussion of the related problems Note (1930) 43 HARv. L. REv. 1293, 1295.
9. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) §§ 49, 50, 2 (b). Compare this with
Mr Beale's list of exceptions wherein the court in the second state may have jurisdiction listed in Beale, loc. cit. supra note 6. The power of the state to tax might be

included between Mr. Beale's "b" and "c" exceptions, namely, the police power and
power of eminent domain.
io. Peppin, Priority of Tax and Special Assessments (1935) 23 COL. L. REv. 264,

275. (That the equities of the state's claim for taxes and a mortgagee's lien are
by the modern view, equal.)
270,
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plicable to a foreign mortgagee's interest in the chattel.", The possible loss
in revenue would be slight as compared to the loss in value of chattel mortgages as a field for capital investment, especially with respect to those on
cattle, automobiles, and other movables. 1 2 As it would be impossible for a
foreign mortgagee to protect himself from the risk of outstanding tax claims
in other states without retaining control of the chattel, the main reason for
the use of the chattel mortgage device, namely, to allow mortgagor the
possession and use of the chattel, would be defeated. Or, if the added risk
involved were included in assaying the costs, the burden of increased costs
would either be borne entirely by mortgagee, thus diminishing his return on
the capital invested, or would be shifted in part or in full on the already
overburdened mortgagor.

Conflict of Laws-Refusal of Federal Court to Take JurisdictionPlaintiff, a citizen of Montana, was injured there by the alleged negligence
of X, who died from the accident. Suit was brought in a Washington District Court against X's administratrix who moved to dismiss the complaint
on the ground that the forum had no jurisdiction. Such a tort obligation
does not survive under Washington law,1 but it does in Montana by statute.2
Held, motion granted, since the action is predicated upon the procedural
machinery provided by the local probate law which excludes such claims
against decedents' estates. Muir v. Kessinger, 35 F. Supp. 116 (E. D.
Wash. 194o).

The usual conflicts rule is that the forum will refer to the law of the
place of wrong in determining whether the obligation survives the death
of the tortfeasor. 3 But the instant court could not look to the Washington
conflicts rule 4 on the question of survival, since it had not been passed
upon. Confronted by this situation, the court might have been justified
in formulating its own conflicts rule and then applied the Montana law.
Such a procedure would have been in harmony with the desirable policy of
ii. BEALE,

op. cit. mipra note 6, at 8o.

"The law of the second state into which

the chattels have been surreptitiously removed without the knowledge of the owner and
against his will does not apply its law (sic.) (italics ours) to divest the title (italics

ours) of the absent owner."
12. 2 BEALE, op.

cit. supra note

I, § 266.1.

i. The common-law rule prevails in Washington. See the instant case at 117 and
Compton v. Evans, 200 Wash. 125, 93 P. (2d) 341 (2939). Furthermore, there is a
statutory limitation on the classes of actions which may be brought against a personal
representative. REal. REv. STAT. (Wash. 1932) §§ 1518 and 152o, enumerate certain
kinds of actions which may be brought, both contract and tort, but actions for personal
injuries are not included, though not expressly excluded.
Note that these restrictions apply likewise to citizens of Washington, and hence
there is no denial of a privilege within the privileges and immunities clause. Instant
case at 118; Chambers v. B. & 0. R. R., 207 U. S. 142 (1907).
2. MONT. REv. CODE ANN. (r935) § 9o86. By modern legislation most claims survive against the representative of a deceased tortfeasor.
3. Ormsby v. Chase, 29o U. S. 387 (1933), 82 U. OF PA. L. REv. 166; Orr v.
Ahern, 107 Conn. 174, 139 At. 691 (1928), 76 U. OF PA. L. REv. 996; Friedman v.
Greenberg, iio N. J. L. 462, i66 Atl. 119 (1933) ; Sumner v. Brown, 312 Pa. 124, 167
Atd. 315 (1933). In these cases, recovery was denied because there was no survival
statute at the locus delicti, although there was one at the forum. See also RESTATEMENT, CONFLIcr OF LAWS (934)

§ 390.

4. In a diversity case, the federal court on substantive matters should apply the
conflicts rule of the state in which it is sitting, and this will determine whether or not

the foreign law should be referred to. Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938),
86 U. OF PA. L. REv. 896.
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uniform interstate enforcement of vested rights.5 In the state courts, there
has been a division of authority on the precise point here involved. Those
denying recovery have done so either because they thought a contrary holding would supposedly violate the so-called public policy 6 of the state of the
forum, or because they felt that they had been deprived of jurisdiction
to entertain the case.7 On the other hand, the courts allowing recovery s
think that uniform interstate enforcement of vested rights is fairer to
the plaintiff and overbalances the questionable weight of the public policy
argument. Apparently the instant court did not feel that public policy
presented any obstacle to recovery," but believed that it lacked jurisdiction entirely, because of the common-law rule of the forum plus the fact

5.See Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N. Y. 99, 12o N. E. I98 (1918), where
Cardozo, J., says at 113: "The fundamental public policy is perceived to be that rights
lawfully vested shall be everywhere maintained. . . . There is a growing conviction
that only exceptional circumstances should lead one of the states to refuse to enforce
a right acquired by another." See Chubbuck v. Holloway, 182 Minn. 225, 230, 234
N. W. 314, 316 (931) ; Herzog v. Stern, 264 N. Y. 379, 386, 1gx N. E. 23, 26 (I934)
(dissenting opinion). See also Goodrich, Public Policy in the Law of Conflicts (936)
36 W. VA. L. Q. 136, 165, and Beach, Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Vested
Rights (1918) 27 YALE L. J. 656. Judge Beach at 664 suggests that this result be
attained ". . . by a logically complete application of the full faith and credit clause
of the Constitution, based upon the principle that the essential nature and real foundation of a cause of action are not changed by recovering judgment on it."
6. Matter of Killough, 148 Misc. 73, 265 N. Y. Supp. 301 (Surr. Ct. 1933); cf.
Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N. Y. 466, 3 N. E. (2d) 597 (1936) ; Windt v. Lindy, 169 Tenn.
210, 84 S. W. (2d) 99 (1935). For a good discussion of the weakness of public policy
as a reason for refusing to select the foreign law, see Goodich, Foreign Facts and Local
Fancies (1938) 25 VA. L. REv. 26; Goodrich, Public Policy in the Law of Conflicts
(1936) 36 W. VA. L. Q. 156.
7. In Herzog v. Stern, 264 N. Y. 379, 191 N. E. 23 (934), Lehman, J., says at
382, that to allow recovery would ". . . not offend our sense of justice or menace
the public welfare", but he bases his decision on the ground that since the legislature
has expressly refused to sanction such an action, the courts of New York have no
jurisdiction to hear such a cause of action. He also relies on RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT
OF LAws (1934) §390, comment b: "If a claim for damages for injuries survives the
death of the . . . wrongdoer, . . ., by the law of the place of the wrong, recovery
may be had upon it . . . against the representative of the decedent, provided the law
of the state of forum permits the representative to . . . be sued on such a claim.
Without such power created by the law of the place of suit, no recovery can be had."
See also GOOlmiCH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1938) 185; STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF
LAWS (1937) 18o.
The Herzog case set at rest a conflict existing in the lower New York courts because of two opposing decisions. Downes v. Storms, 236 App. Div. 630, 260 N. Y.
Supp. 335 (4th Dep't 1932) (allowed recovery, based on the reasoning of the Loucks
case) ; Matter of Killough, 148 Misc. 73, 265 N. Y. Supp. 301 (Surr. Ct. 1933) (denied
recovery since against public policy). The result reached in the Herzog case is criticized in (1934) 83 U. OF PA. L. RFv. 84.
It is important to note that two federal courts have reached the same result as that
of the instant case. Woollen v. Lorenz, 98 F. (2d) 261 (App. D. C. 1938) (decision
based on lack of jurisdiction, i. e., the forum has failed to provide a court) ; Dougherty
v. Gutenstein, io F. Supp. 782 (S. D. N. Y. 1935) (decision based on public policy).
It seems that the former reason is the more desirable.
8. Chubbuck v. Holloway, 182 Minn. 225, 234 N. W. 314 (I93I), rev'd on other
grounds, 182 Minn. 231, 234 N. W. 868 (93), 29 MICH. L. Ray. 929. The court says
at 23o: "Under the Wisconsin statute plaintiff has a vested right, and the uniform interstate enforcement of vested rights is desirable. . . . While the Wisconsin statute
is different from our law, it is not so hostile to the policy reflected in our statutes and
judicial records as to cause us to decline jurisdiction." Cf. Skillman v. Conner, 193
Atl. 563 (Sup. Ct. Del. 1937). The Chubbuck case was followed in Downes v. Storms,
236 App. Div. 630, 260 N. Y. Supp. 335 (4th Dep't 1932), but this case was later overruled in Herzog v. Stern, 264 N. Y. 379, 19I N. E. 23 (934).
9. Instant case at 117. See also Reynolds v. Day, 79 Wash. 499, 140 Pac. 68r
(1914).
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that the Washington statute while expressly providing for survival of
some tort obligations had omitted the one in question.10 It is difficult to
understand how a state statute per se, and then only by inference, can
reduce the scope of the jurisdiction of a federal court. The instant result
conflicts with the doctrine of Loucks v. Standard Oil Co.,"' adopted by
the Restatement,"2 that rights once vested should be enforced everywhere

unless strongly against the public policy of the forum. This condition is
concededly lacking in the instant case. 1" In addition, the argument that
the procedural machinery is inadequate 14 is not convincing, since a judgment for personal injuries can be pressed against the estate quite as easily
as one for property 15 damage. It seems unfair that the plaintiff should
suffer to the benefit of the deceased's legatees or heirs because of the unfortunate circumstances of the wrongdoer's death. 16 But in spite of the
plaintiff's plight and the compelling philosophy of the Loucks case, an opposite result here would seem to clash with the doctrine that the state alone
should control the orderly administration of estates 17 and matters incident
thereto. Furthermore it is certainly arguable that a federal court in a diversity case should give weight to the obvious inference of a state statute., 8
It is true that refusing the plaintiff a forum virtually destroys '" a right
vested in him in Montana, but in view of the conflict of legal doctrines here
involved, it seems that the only appropriate remedy lies with the Washington
legislature. It may follow the action of New York after the decision in
Herzog v. Stern,' and amend 2its statute so that such claims may be pursued against decedents' estates. '

Constitutional Law-Constitutionality of Statute Permitting
State Licensing Official to Pass on Religious Nature of Cause-Defendants were indicted for violation of a statute against solicitation of conio. See note I supra and instant case at I18.
11. 224 N. Y. 99, 12o N. E. 198 (1918). See also note 5 supra.
12. RESTATMENT, CONFLICt OF LAWS (1934) § 612, comment c.
13. Instant case at 117.
14. Cf. Slater v. Mexican Nat. R. R., 194 U. S.

120 (1904), where it was thought
that the procedural machinery for enforcing the type of decree sought was inadequate.
This is a more realistic difficulty than that of the instant case.
15. Claims for property damage by the tortfeasor survive his death. REM. REa.
STAT. (Wash. 1932) § 1520.
16. See Evans, Survival of Claims For and Against Executors and Admninistrators
(193o) ig Ky. L. J. I95.
17. See Herzog v. SteM, 264 N. Y. 379, 382, 19I N. E. 23, 24 (934), 83 U. oF
PA. L. REv. 84; Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N. Y. 466, 476, 3 N. E. (2d) 597 (1936) (dissenting opinion) ; Matter of Killough, 148 Misc. 73, 85, 265 N. Y. Supp. 301, 317 (Surr.
Ct. 1933). See also STUMBE G, CONFLICT OF LAws (937) 186, criticizing the use of
the law of the locus delicti in survival actions, because survival is more akin to the
administration of estates than to tortious injuries.
i8. In diversity cases the federal courts must follow the state's construction of its
statutes. Section 34, judiciary Act of 1789, I STAT. 92, § 34 (1879), 28 U. S. C. A.
§ 725 (1928). This rule was reiterated in Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
ig. It will probably be impossible for the plaintiff to get jurisdiction over the administratrix in Montana, and there no showing that deceased has any property in Montana which might necessitate an ancillary administration.
20. Instant case at 118. N. Y. DEc. ESTATE LAW, § 118.
21. The purpose of the Loucks case would be achieved if this privilege were ex-

tended to citizens of other states only. But it is likely that if the statute is amended
at all, the privilege will extend to all. Otherwise the stock argument of non-residents
having greater rights than residents will be raised.
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tributions for any alleged religious, charitable or philanthropic cause without a license. Defendants, members of a religious sect known as Jehovah's
Witnesses, objected to the statute because it permitted the licensing official
to pass upon the religious nature of the cause. Held, statute unconstitutional as a deprivation of liberty without due process of the law.' Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (194o).
Although not the first Supreme Court case to say that religious freedom is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, 2 the instant case is the
first to hold a state statute unconstitutional for infringing upon religious
freedom. 3 As recently as 1916 4 this freedom was held not to be under the
protection of the Amendment in spite of the fact that it appears to have
been the purpose of the framers to include the whole body of ordinary civil
rights I within the "privileges and immunities" 1 clause, particularly those7
enumerated in the first eight amendments to the Federal Constitution.
However, the clause became a nullity after early decisions 8 denied protection to these rights and it was not until the development of substantive "due
process" 1 that they were afforded any protection from state encroachment.
Probably because of this development state governments, unlike the Federal government, are permitted a reasonable degree of regulation under
i. U. S. COi ST. AmxD. XIV, § I: "All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
2. Note (194o) 39 MicH. L. REV. 149, 15, TL 8; (1938) 86 U. OF PA. L. RaV.

431, n. 4.

3. See Schneider v. State, 308 U. S.147 (1939), where defendant, one of Jehovah's
Witnesses, refused to apply for a solicitor's license required by a local ordinance on the
grounds that she believed doing so would be an act of disobedience to the command of
God. Basing its decision on Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 ('938), the court held the
ordinance unconstitutional as a curtailment of defendant's freedom of speech. The case
is discussed in (3940) I BiLL OF RIGHTS REV. 53. See also Tucker v. Randall, 15 A.
(2d) 324 (N. J.Sup. Ct. I94O), where the court, basing its opinion upon the Schneider
case, held a local ordinance unconstitutional because it trenched upon the right of religious freedom as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the New Jer-

sey State Constitution. This case also involved one of Jehovah's Witnesses.
As for the possible effect of the decision in the Cautwell case upon state court decisions holding similar state statutes and ordinances constitutional, see Note (3940) 128
A. L. R. 1361. For discussions of the instant case see (394o) 4o CoL. L. REv. lO67;
(940) 15 ST. JOHNS L. REv. 94; (940)
14 So. CALIF. L. REv. 56.
4. Brunswick-Balke-Collander Co. v. Evans, 228 Fed. 991 (D. C. Ore. 1916) (citing in support of its proposition Permoli v. First Municipality, 3 How. 589, 6o9 (0845),
a case decided before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment).
5. See Note (940) 9 G. WASH. L. REV. io6, n. 3.
6. See note i supra.
7. See Note (394o) 9 G. WASH. L. REV. io6, n. 4.
8. These decisions, known as the Slaughter House Cases, are discussed in Howard,
The Privileges and Immunities of Federal Citizenship and Colgate v. Harvey (1939)
87 U. OF PA. L. REV. 262, 263.
9. For cases see Note (3940) 9 G. WASH. L. REv. io6, 115, n. 72. See also Borchard, The Supreme Court and Private Rights (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 1051; Warren,
The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment (1926) 39 HARv.L. REV.431;
Note (938) 7 BROOK. L. Rw¢.49o. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S.390, 399 (1923) :
"'No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.'
. . . the term has received much consideration and some of the included
things . . . [are] . . . the right of the individual to contract, to engage in
any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, to
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates
of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."
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their police power. 10

Thus, the Federal government's function, as guar-

antor of this freedom, is to test the statute for legitimacy of purpose 11 and
reasonableness of means.' 2 No fault can be found with the purpose of a
statute designed, as the instant one is, to protect the public from fraudulent
solicitations. But determining whether the means of accomplishing this
result are reasonable requires balancing the utility of the statute with the
magnitude of the harm likely to result from it.1 3 Compared to the social
value of the freedom infringed upon, the value of the interest protected by
the statute is slight. And, while this method is fairly certain to achieve the
desired end, it is not so much more efficient than the deterring effect of
penal laws punishing fraudulent solicitations to warrant even a slight
abridgment of religious freedom. Therefore, by permitting an official to
withhold a license because he finds the cause to be a non-religious one, the
statute is unreasonable and amounts to a "previous restraint" '4 upon
defendants' freedom of religion in spite of provisions for appeals from
adverse rulings. Because the entire problem is one of balancing interests,
the situation may arise where the purpose of the regulation is of such great
social importance that even greater infringements upon religious freedom
would be "reasonable". 15 However, religious freedom is so fundamental
io. It is conceivable that had these freedoms been protected by the "privileges and
immunities" clause state governments would have been as incapable to impair them,
even under police power, as the Federal Government is.
Conduct pursued for religious purposes was held properly punished or prohibited by
exercise of the police power in the following cases: United States v. Macintosh, 283
U. S. 6o5, 623 (93)
(refusal to take arms to defend country) ; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11 (195o)
(refusal to be vaccinated) ; Reynolds v. United States,
98 U. S. 145 (1878) (polygamy) ; Knowles v. United States, 17o Fed. 409 (C. C. A.
8th, 19o9) (dissemination of lewd literature) ; Shapiro v. Lyle, 3o F. (2d) 971 (D. C.
Wash. 1929) (unlimited use of "Sacramental" wine); Fealy v. Birmingham, 15 Ala.
App. 367, 73 So. 296 (1916) (faith healing without medical qualifications) ; State v.
Blair, 13o Kan. 863, 288 Pac. 729 (193o) (disrespect for the Sabbath) ; Delk v. Commonwealth, 166 Ky. 39, 178 S. W. 1129 (1915) (use of obscene language) ; State v.
Markus, 120 Me. 84, 113 Atl. 39 (1921) (blasphemy); State v. White, 64 N. H. 48,
5 Ati. 828 (1886) (parading or beating of drums) ; State v. Marble, 72 Ohio St. 21,
73 N. E. lO63 (195o)
(practice of medicine without a license) ; Peterson v. Widule,
157 Wis. 641, 147 N. W. 966 (914) (refusal of prospective groom to undergo a physical examination).
iI. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (i93i).
12. See New York ex reL. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 63, 72 (1928).
13. This is the same kind of balancing used in the field of negligence law. The
factors on each side can be broken down in the same way as in the RESTATEmENT,
ToRTS (1934) § 291 et seq. Such an analysis makes it easier to distinguish cases which
on the surface seem contrary. See note 15 infra.
14. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 713 (1931) ; PATrmsoN, FREE SPEECH
AND A FREE PRESS (1939)

204.

15. See Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586 (94O), 39 MICH.
L. REV. 149, 15 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 95, 14 So. CALIF. L. REV. 73, 4 U. OF DETROIT L. J.
38, in which the court held constitutional a regulation requiring grade school pupils to
pledge allegiance to the flag in spite of religious objections to so doing. In this case,
also, the non-conformer was one of Jehovah's Witnesses. The Gobitis case has been
criticized as being contra to the instant Cantwell case which preceded it. Comparisons
of the two cases are made in (1940) 40 COL. L. REV. 1O67 and (194o) 4 U. OF DETROIT
L. J. 38, 41. However, under the analysis used above vital differences can be found.
The instant regulation was unreasonable because the purpose to be achieved was not
of as much social value as the freedom encroached upon. There was never any doubt
that the means adopted would accomplish that purpose. On the other hand, the purpose behind the regulation in the Gobitir case, to foster and preserve national unity,
was of as much, if not more, social utility than religious freedom, especially when we
consider the number of persons affected on each side. If the regulation was unreasonable, and it is submitted that it was, it was because the means adopted would not accomplish the result intended.
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that it should not be outweighed unless a "clear
or present danger"
17

the government makes it necessary to do so.

16

to

Evidence-Blood Grouping Tests as a Violation of Privilege
against Self-Incrimination and an Invasion of the Right of PrivacyHusband sued wife for divorce on grounds of adultery, alleging he was
not the father of W's child. He petitioned for a blood group test of all
three parties for the purpose of proving his non-parentage, as authorized
by state statute.1 The parties agreed by stipulation as to the validity and
evidential value of the tests.2 Held, petition denied; to order such tests
would violate W's privilege against self-incrimination and her constitutional right of privacy, despite the statutory authorization. Bediarik v.
Bednarik, 16 A. (2d) 8o (N. J. Ch. 1940).
The privilege against self-incrimination is quite generally held to
embrace only actual testimony extorted, and to give no immunity from exposing the body, upon the theory that in the latter case, the body is itself
the real evidence and is not testimony.'
Thus, forcible exhibition of
16. It seems paradoxical that just when these rights become most important we
are forced to temporarily abandon them in order to preserve the institutions which
guarantee their existence. For a discussion of the cases allowing the Federal Government to infringe upon some of the fundamental rights in order to insure its existence
see Johnson, Post-War Protection of Freedom of Opinion (1940) I WASH. & LEE L.
REy. 192.
17. It has been suggested that "in vindication of these basic rights

. . . the

customary presumption of validity be withheld from encroaching legislation. The burden of explanation should be placed upon government to justify the necessity for any
direct invasion of this zone of constitutional immunity. In practice, the Court seems
to be drifting in this direction." Johnson, supra note 16, at 212. As illustrations of
the "drifting" Professor Johnson cites Thornhill v. Alabama, 31o U. S. 88 (194o) and
Carlson v. California, 31o U. S. io6 (1940).
I. 2 N. J. STAT. ANN., c. 99, § 2:99-4 (Supp. ig4o) : "Whenever it shall be relevant in a civil action to determine the parentage or the identity of any child or other

person, the court, by order, may direct that any party to the action and the person
whose parentage or identity is involved submit to one or more blood grouping tests.
Whenever such test is ordered and made, the testimony of the experts to the results thereof . . . shall be receivable in evidence, but only in cases where definite
exclusion is indicated. . . ." For other similar statutes, see Me. Laws 1939, C. 259;
N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr (939)
§ 3o6a; OHio GEN. CODE ANN. (Throckmorton, 194o)

§ 12122-1

; WIs. STAT. (1939)

§ 325.23.

2. Thus was removed from the controversy the interesting medico-legal aspect of
the blood grouping tests. The tests can work only to exclude a party as a parent and
cannot affirmatively prove parentage. Flippen v. Meinhold, 156 Misc. 451, 282 N. Y.
Supp. 444 (N. Y. City Cts. 1935). Hence the results are inadmissible, by statutory
terms, when exclusion is not shown. Present-day opinion tends to recognize the scientific reliability of the tests. See copious authority cited in instant case at 82, n. 1; State
v. Damm, 64 S. D. 309, 312, 266 N. W. 667, 668 (1936) ; Britt, Blood Grouping Tests
and the Law: The Problem of "Cultural Lag" (1937) 21 MINN. L. REV. 671, 694, n. 83;
Britt, Blood Grouping Tests and More "Cultural Lag" (938) 22 MINN. L. REV. 836,
841, n. 22. Cf. Arais v. Kalensnikoff, io Cal. (2d) 428, 74 P. (2d) 1043, ii5 A. L. R.
163, 167 (1937) ; Commonwealth v. English, 123 Pa. Super. 161, 186 Atl. 298 (1936).
3. Holt v. United States, 218 U. S. 245 (19io); see 8 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE (3d
ed. 1940) §§ 2216 (c), 2263, 2265; Inbau, Self-Incrimination--What Can an Accused
Person Be Compelled to Do? (937) 28 JouR. CRIM. L. AND CRIMIN. 261.
"The tendency of the more modern cases is to restrict the constitutional privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination to confessions, and admissions proceeding from
the accused, and to open the door to the reception of all kinds of 'real evidence' or
proof of physical facts, which speak for themselves." State v. Graham, 116 La. 779,
782, 41 So. 90, 91 (9o6).
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scars 4 and voice, 5 the taking of fingerprints," photographs, 7 and comparison of footprints s are not violative of the privilege. The instant court
seems to have ignored this fundamental distinction between real and testimonial evidence in denying examination of substance of the body. Reliance was placed upon a line of cases denying the right to force physical
examination to ascertain the presence of veneral disease in defendants in
rape cases, 9 a doctrine, not universal in application, 10 which is criticized
as being clearly contra to the basic principle of the privilege against selfincrimination." In the few other parentage cases involving blood group
tests which have reached appellate courts, the results of the tests have

usually been admitted;

12

and a power to force submission has been exer-

cised where authorized by statute as in the instant case,' 3 thus confirming
the view that blood tests constitute real evidence not within the scope of

the immunity.

Furthermore, the courts have been favorable to the ad-

mission of blood and urine tests to determine intoxication, denying any
infringement of the privilege. 14 An analogy thereto seems most persuasive. Novel, but equally questionable, in the blood grouping cases, is the
court's concept of a violation of a constitutional right of privacy. Stemming from the constitutional guaranties of natural rights, 15 particularly
that of personal security, the theory is that "To subject a person against
his will to a blood test is an assault and battery, and clearly an invasion
7
of his personal privacy." "I No doubt this privacy right exists;1 mani4. O'Brien v. State, 125 Ind. 38, 25 N. E. 137 (i8go) ; State v. Ah Chuey, I4 Nev.
79 (1879).
5. See Johnson v. Commonwealth, 115 Pa. 369, 395, 9 At. 78, 81 (1887).
6. United States v. Kelly, 55 F. (2d) 67 (1932) ; People v. Sallow, ioo Misc. 447,
I65 N. Y. Supp. 915 (917).
7. Shaffer v. United States, 24 App. D. C. 417 (904).
8. Magee v. State, 92 Miss. 865, 46 So. 529 (19o8) ; State v. Borela, 23 N. M. 395,
I68 Pac. 545 (1917).
9. State v. Height, 117 Iowa 65o, 9i N. W. 935 (1902); People v. Corder, 244
Mich. 274, 221 N. W. 309 (1924); State v. Newcomb, 220 Mo. 54, 119 S. W. 4o5
(299).

io. See contrary view expressed in United States v. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. Is. 145
(1912).

ii. See Ladd and Gibson, The Medico-Legal Aspects of the Blood Test to Determine Intoxication (2939) 24 IowA L. Rav. 192, 220 et seq.; 8 WIGM2ORE, op. cit. supra
note 3, § 2216 (c) ; Inbau, note 3 supra at 269; (2929) 29 CoL. L. REv. 214.
12. In re Swahn's Estate, 158 Misc. 17, 285 N. Y. Supp. 234 (Surr. Ct. 1936);

State v. Wright, 59 Ohio App. igi, 17 N. E. (2d) 428 (1938); State v. Welling, 6
Ohio Op. 371 (936); Commonwealth v. Visocki, 23 Pa. D. & C. 203 (1934); Euclide
v. State, 231 Wis. 616, 286 N. W. 3 (1939) ; see State v. Damm, 64 S. D. 309, 322, 266
N. W. 667, 668 (1936) ; cf. Beuschel v. Manowitz, 241 App. Div. 888, 272 N. Y. Supp.
165 (1934), rev'g, 151 Misc. 899 (Sup. Ct. 1934). Contra: Commonwealth v. English,
123 Pa. Super. 161, 186 AtI. 298 (1936).
13. In re Swahn's Estate, 158 Misc. 17, 285 N. Y. Supp. 234 (Surr. Ct. 1936). See
Taylor v. Diamond, 241 App. Div. 702 (2d Dep't 1934) and Commonwealth v. English, 123 Pa. Super. 161, 186 Atl. 298 (1936), holding that such statutory authorization
is necessary before the court can compel submission to the tests, with which compare
State v. Damm, 64 S. D. 309, 266 N. W. 667 (1936), stating that such a power is inherent in the court and requires no legislative sanction. The objection of those courts
demanding statutory authority is not constitutional, but rather that it is up to the legislature to recognize the scientific value of the tests as evidence. See Commonwealth v.
English, supra. The stand taken by the New York courts was circumvented by the subsequent enactment of the necessary enabling statute. See N. Y. Civ. PRAC. Acr (1939)
§3o6a; it re Swahn's Estate, supra.
14. State v. Gatton, 6o Ohio App. 192, 20 N. E. (2d) 265 (1938) ; see State v.
Duguid, 5o Ariz. 276, 281, 72 P. (2d) 435, 438 (937) ; Ladd and Gibson, note ii supra
at 228 et seq.
i5. N. J. CoNsT. Art. I, par. I.
16. Instant case at 90.

17. See, e. g., Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68

(2905).
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festly however it is not absolute.18 Such a guaranty serves to prevent
an unreasonable invasion of natural rights, but it would seem inapplicable
to allow the perpetration of a fraud 19 by naming a man the father of an-

other's child, with the accompanying liabilities.

Moreover, conceding it

to be the duty of the courts to dispense justice, it would likewise appear
the duty of a litigant to assist them in seeking truth upon reasonable demand by the court. 2 ' The great majority of the courts recognize in themselves, either by the common law or by statute, a power to compel an
injured plaintiff to submit to a physical examination, including blood tests,
with no invasion of personal inviolability. 21 Even the minority rule, denying such power, may be abrogated by statutory command. 22 In none of
the situations above mentioned involving compulsory submission of the
body as real evidence was such a right effective to assert immunity; to
apply it to blood grouping tests appears unreasonable. The instant decision is to be regretted in that it fails to follow the majority and more
enlightened view of what is embraced by the self-incrimination privilege,
and refuses to accept a presently recognized valid means aiding in the
ascertainment of truth in judicial controversies.

Federal Jurisdiction-Binding Effect of State Law on Federal
Courts-The Court of Chancery of New Jersey had previously held '
that a New Jersey statute 2 did not change the current state law invalidating
tentative trusts. On appeal from a decision of the circuit court of appeals
disregarding these state rulings and upholding the beneficiary's claim,8 it
was held that federal courts are bound to follow the decisions of intermedi18. See Jacobsen v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. II, 26 (905) ; 8 WIGMOX Op. Cit.
supra note 3, at 191: "In truth, there is no 'inviolability of the person' in any absolute
sense; and an appeal to it is merely false rhetoric."
19. See 8 WIGMOR-, op. cit. supra note 3, at 191.
It seems
20. See State v. Damm, 64 S. D. 309, 316, 266 N. W. 667, 67o (1936).
hardly arguable that the taking of a single drop of blood as required by the test is unreasonable, in view of the many other irregularities to which a party may be subjected
by the courts. See Lee, Blood Tests for Paternity (1926) 82 A. B. A. J. 441, 442;
Ladd and Gibson, note ii supraat 240.
21. Schroeder v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 47 Iowa 375 (1877) ; Hayt v. Brewster,
Gordon & Co., 199 App. Div. 68, 191 N. Y. Supp. 176 (Sup. Ct. 1921) ; Notes (1927)
51 A. L. R. 183, (935) 20 CORN. L. Q. 232, 238, (935) 44 YALE L. J. 508, 509.
22. Thus, the rule of the federal courts, long the leading exponent of the minority
rule [Union Pacific Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U. S. 250 (i89o) ] has been changed by the

new federal rules of civil procedure [Rule 35 (a), (b)]. Hence the grounds of the
minority jurisdictions, denying compulsory examination, cannot be constitutional, else
the statutory change would be ineffective in removing the impediment.
i. Travers v. Reid, 889 N. J. Eq. 416, 182 Atl. 9o8 (1936) ; Thatcher v. Trenton
Trust Co., 1ig N. J. Eq. 408, 182 Atl. 912 (1936).
tit. I7, c. 9, § 4: "When a deposit . . . shall be
2. N. J. STAT. ANN. (939)
made

. . . by a person in trust for another

. . . the same or any part thereof

shall in the event of the death of the trustee be paid to the person in trust for

whom the deposit was made. . . ." In the Fidelity case deceased had had transferred a savings bank account from her name to "Edith M. Peck in trust for Edith
Adelaide Field". After Miss Peck's death plaintiff sought a decree establishing her
claim to the account.
3. Field v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., io8 F. (2d) 521 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939), (94o)
88 U. OF PA. L. Rzv. 487. The circuit court cited and discussed most of the existing
pertinent decisions and felt that the weight of authority supported its position. In addition to the cases there mentioned as in accord with the holding are Woods et al. v.
Deck, 112 F. (2d) 739 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940); Summers v. Travelers Ins. Co. et al.,
8O9 F. (2d) 845 (C. C. A. 8th, 894o); Kehaya v. Axton, 32 F. Supp. 266 (D. C. S. D.
N. Y. 194o).
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ate state courts.' Fidelity Union Trust Co. et al. v. Field, 61 Sup. Ct. 176
(U. S. 1940).
After the District Court had applied existing state law in dismissing
plaintiff's petition, the Ohio Supreme Court5 reversed its former decisions. On appeal from the circuit court's refusal 6 to reverse on the basis
of this change, it was held that Federal courts must apply state law "...7
in accordance with the then controlling decision of the highest state court".
Vandenbark v. The Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 9 U. S. L. WEEK 4112

(U. S. 194).
These decisions reach another milestone in securing uniformity of
law between the Federal and state courts." The Fidelity case settles, to
some extent at least, a question which has been pertinent since Erie R. R.
v. Tompkins 9 and posed in a recent issue of the Review. 10 The language," however, in the instant and other recent cases 12 is so limited
as to include, in addition to the highest court of the state, 13 only intermediate appellate courts in that group of tribunals whose rulings are
binding upon the Federal courts. But the logical extension of the policy
that prompted both the Erie and the instant cases would bind the Federal
courts by the decision of any state court,14 irrespective of its status in the
state judicial system. It was that same policy which urged the Court in
the Vandenbark case to reverse a decision even though correct when
4. Three similar holding have also been announced at this term of Court: Stoner

v. New York Life Ins. Co., 9 U. S. L. WEEK 4095 (U. S. 1940) (Federal court must
follow Kansas City Court of Appeals of Missouri) ; Six Companies of California et al.
v. Joint Highway Dist. No. I3,etc., 61 Sup. Ct. 186 (U. S.1940) (District Court of
Appeal of California) ; West et al. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co. (two
cases), 61 Sup. Ct. 179 (U. S.1940) (Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals of Ohio).
This is really a case of res judicata, but the Court announced a much broader rule as
to include the instant situation. Fidelity case at 178.
5. Triff v. National Bronze and Aluminum Foundry Co., 135 Ohio St. 191, 205, 20

N. E. (2d) 232, 238 (1939).
6. no F. (2d) 31o (C. C. A. 6th, 1940).
7. Vandenbark case at 4113.
8. In Swift v. Tyson, 16 Peters i (U. S. 1842) the Court interpreted Section 34 of
the Judiciary Act of 1789 (see note 21 infra) to mean that only state statutes and decisions construing them need be followed by the Federal courts. This was overruled
by Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938), 86 U. OF PA. L. REV. 896, which extended the requirement to include all state court decisions. In the instant cases both
points are involved, that of state statutory law in the Fidelity case and that of state
"common law" in the Vandenbark case.
9. 304 U. S. 64 (1938), 86 U. OF PA. L. REv. 896.
10. (1940) 88 U. OF PA. L. REV. 487, 490, where the circuit court decision was,
criticised as hampering the policy of the Erie case.
ii. "An intermediate state court in declaring and applying the state law
should be followed by a federal court in deciding a state question." (Italics supplied)
Fidelity case at 178.
12. See note 4 supra.
13. The cases supporting that proposition are now legion.. It was the rule, with
regard to state statutes and cases construing them, long settled since Swift v. Tyson,
16 Peters i (U. S. 1842). In connection with other matters it has been accepted dogma
since Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938), 86 U. OF PA. L. REV. 896. See
note 9 supra.
14. It was the desire to eliminate varying rules of law based simply on the accident
of diversity of citizenship that led to the continued expansion of the Erie doctrine. But
see In re F. & D. Co., 256 Fed. 73 (C. C. A. 2d, I919), where the Circuit Court refused to follow a decision of the Special Term of the Supreme Court for Saratoga Co.,
N. Y. See also Buder v. New York Trust Co., 107 F. (2d) 705 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939),
cert. denied, 309 U. S. 677 (I94O), where it was said: "Dicta by a trial court justice
. are not an authoritative declaration of the state law".
By the same token it was intended to effect the complete renunciation of the view
once current that, absent a decision by the highest court of the state, required a series
of lower court rulings to "establish" state law. See Mangol v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 103 F. (2d) 14, 17 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939) ; Shulman, The Demise of Swift v. Tyson
(938) 47 YALE L. J. 1336.
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made."5 Rulings to date leave open the further problem of the function
of the Federal courts in the absence of any state court decision at all.'6
One position was successfully urged on the Supreme Court in the recent
bankruptcy case (where the exercise of jurisdiction is discretionary with
the court 17) of Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.' s It was there felt
that the Court should not bind the litigants before it by a holding which in
the light of some subsequent decision by the highest court of the state,
might prove to be contrary to state law.' 9 Such a development, purely a
matter of conjecture, was deemed sufficient to deter the court from itself
determining a question of local law. Yet a similar possibility, namely that
an intermediate state court might be overruled by the state Supreme
15. It was on this basis that the Circuit Court refused to reverse the lower court:
"It would be anomalous to . . . hold that a state court has power to compel reversal of
a federal decision correctly applying existing state law". Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois
Glass Co., iio F.

(2d)

310, 313 (C. C. A. 6th, 194o).

The court felt also that they

were bound by previous decisions of the Supreme Court, most of which were mentioned
and overruled in the instant case. Vandenbark case at 4113. The court did not cite as
supporting authority other cases holding to the same effect. People of Sioux County,
Nebraska v. National Surety Co., 276 U. S. 238 (1928) ; Bauserman v. Blunt, 147 U. S.
647 (1893).
16. Cases are numerous wherein various Federal courts did themselves determine
an issue of state law without the guide of some previous state court decision. Of the
recent holdings only one involved federal jurisdiction based solely on diversity of jurisdiction. DeLong v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 5O9 F. (2d) 585 (C. C. A. 5th,
I94O).

In Driscoll et al. v. Edison Light & Power Co., 307 U. S. 104,

112

(1939),

where the court was one of special statutory creation to decide questions concerning
the validity of the orders of an administrative commission operating under the same
statute, it was said: "As the conclusion of the lower (Federal) court on this point is
not supported by a state decision we analyze for ourselves the provisions of the section".
Other recent cases are Schwager v. Schwager, lo9 F. (2d) 754 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940) ;
Seaboard Mut. Casualty Co. v. Profit, lo8 F. (2d) 597 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940) ; Stone
v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., lO3 F. (2d) 544 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939), aff'd, 308 U. S.
522 (1939) (involving the constitutionality of a state statute under the Federal constitution) ; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Wilkins, et al., 33 F. Supp. 117 (D. C. Fla. 194o) ; Cline
v. Southern Ry. Co., 31 F. Supp. 657 (D. C. N. C. 594o). By analogy from the above
the Court might very well hold it the duty of the Federal courts to determine for themselves previously undecided questions of state law.
17. "A court of bankruptcy has an exclusive and non-delegable control over the
administration of an estate in its possession. But the proper exercise of that control
may . . . lead the bankruptcy court to consent to submission to state courts of particular controversies involving unsettled questions of state property law and arising in the
course of bankruptcy administration." Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309
U. S. 478, 483 (1940).
18. 309 U. S. 478 (940),

7 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 727. There is a distinct problem
as to the applicability of the Erie doctrine to the cases where the Federal court has
jurisdiction on other than diversity grounds. The position has been taken that under
such circumstances the Federal courts can, consistently with the Erie case, propound
their own interpretation of state law. Shulman, note 14 suprar at 1350. But in view
of the general policy to attain uniformity of the law, it has been asserted that the Erie
doctrine has significance in the bankruptcy situation. (1940) 7 U. OF CHI. L. REv.
727, 730. It is clear, however, that the Magnolia case does not stand for the proposition that in a diversity case, the Federal court will, in the absence of some state court
decision, refuse to decide the issue.
A question remains yet undetermined: In such a situation as that in the Driscoll
case, note 16 supra, for example, where the Federal court has juridsiction by virtue of
a statute which is silent concerning which rule of law is to govern, does the Erie doctrine apply?
19. "Unless the matter is referred to the state courts, upon subsequent decision by
the Supreme Court of Illinois it may appear that rights in local property of parties to
this proceeding have-by the accident of federal jurisdiction-been determined contrary
to the law of the State which in such matters is supreme." Thompson v. Magnolia
Petroleum Co., 309 U. S. 478, 484 (940).
The Court directed the lower court to
". ..
provide (for) appropriate submission of the question to the Illinois state courts".

Ibid.
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Court, was rejected in the Fidelity case as mere conjecture.2 0 And if
conjecture does become reality, as in the Vandenbark case, the solution
there adopted would appear to be eminently satisfactory. It might be
argued further that under Section 34 of the Judiciary Act 21 and the Erie
case, it was the province of Federal tribunals to "apply", not to "make"
state law, in the proper situations; and where there is no state law there
is nothing for the Federal court to do. But it is difficult to perceive the
advantage of relegating the plaintiff to a suit in the state court, 22 while to
do so in the instant circumstances would be to contravene the statute conferring diversity jurisdiction on the Federal courts.23 A final situation is
presented where there exist divergent state court decisions.2 4 In that
event, were the Magnolia decision to be applied to a case in which jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, it would be but a short step
to hold that the federal judge was to adopt a "hands off" policy and save
the controversy for the state courts.25 Such a result would eliminate, in
effect, any independent interpretation of the state law by the federal
judge.28 However, the language in the Fidelity case explicitly indicates
that he is to follow lower state court rulings only ".

. in the absence of

.

more convincing evidence of what the state law is .

.

.".27

And again,

2o. "Here . . . there is no conflict of decision. Whether there ever will be, or
the Court of Errors and Appeals will disapprove the rulings in the . . . [lower state
court] cases, is merely a matter of conjecture. At the present time the . . . cases
stand as the only exposition of the law of the State . . . and the Circuit Court of

Appeals was not at liberty to reject these decisions. . . ." Instant case at 179.
21. REv. STAT. § 721 (2875), 28 U. S. C. A. 725 (1928).
"The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States
otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common
law, in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply."
22. Proceedings in the state court would mean an eventual decision by a state trial
court judge. There is nothing to indicate that the federal judge would not be as competent to determine an issue of state law. In fact neither decision would be binding
on any other state court in the future. And it would be a relatively simple matter for
the Federal court to ". . . determine the law of that state from the rule in other
jurisdictions, taking into consideration any decision of Wisconsin concerning matters
of a relevant nature". Schwager v. Schwager, lO9 F. (2d) 754, 756 (C. C. A. 7th,
1940).
23. See (1940) 7 U. oF CHr. L. REv. 727, 731.
24. That problem was presented in Samuels v. Quartin et al., io8 F. (2d) 789, 791
(C. C. A. 2d, 294o). The court held: "With a conflict in the lower courts and with
no word from the Court of Appeals on the point, we are left to our own devices." It
seems odd that the court even discussed the lower court decisions, since the same tribunal had previously decided that such cases are not binding on the Federal courts.
Irving National Bank v. Law, 9 F. (2d) 536, 537 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925). See also
Sampson v. Welch, 23 F. Supp. 271, 277 (S.D. Cal. 1938), where in the face of conflicting state court decisions, the District Court said it would decide as "...
it believes the state court will ultimately and authoritatively declare".
25. There is no subsantial distinction between selecting one of several irreconcilable state court decisions as indicative of state law, on the one hand, and announcing
a new interpretation thereof in the absence of any other holding, on the other. In both
cases, for purposes of the immediate litigation before the court, it is "making" state
law. See note 24 supra.
26. That such was not the purpose of the Erie case has been adequately asserted.
Corbin, The Common Law of the United States (1938) 47 YALE L. 3. 1351, 1352;
Shulman, note 14 supra at 1349.
27. Instant case at 178. Almost identical language appears in the other recent
cases cited note 4 supra. Patently the Court meant to allow the Federal court discretion where the lower state court had announced a ruling contrary to the view, not of
the Federal court, but rather of the Supreme Court of the state, as considered, however, by the Federal court. It is here that the Federal judge can do more than merely
indicate, by way of dictum, his opinion of the lower court ruling; he can disregard it.
Thus, ". . . an intermediate appellate state court . . . is not to be disregarded by
a federal court unless it is convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of
the state would decide otherwise." West et al. v. American Telephone and Telegraph
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the approach in the Vandenbark case would be adequate to cope with the
difficulty if the state law were eventually to become settled differently.'

Fraudulent Conveyances-Antenuptial Conveyance in Fraud of
Marital Rights-Decedent, prior to marriage, and without betrothed's
knowledge, conveyed real estate to defendants, sons by former marriage,
in consideration of "love and affection". Widow sues to have deed declared
void as violation of her marital rights. Held, conveyances are not in fraud
of an intended wife merely by proof that they are voluntarily made without
the other's knowledge, but "actual fraud" must appear as well. Kirk v.
Kirk, Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Nov. i, i94o, p. i, col. i (Sup. Ct. Pa.
1940).
Despite the fact that Pennsylvania has long since abolished dower' as
such, and substituted statutory provisions, 2 the instant case is the first to
cast aside the common law presumption of fraud in antenuptial conveyances.' At common law it was thought that any conveyance of realty by
one about to marry, unknown to the prospective wife, if such as to diminish
the property from which she would be dowable, was void as to her inchoate
dower.' These facts were sufficient, unless rebutted, to create prima facie
Co., 61 Sup. Ct. i79, 183 (194o). There is likewise nothing to indicate the elimination
of the procedure of honestly distinguishing state court cases. But there is often divergence of opinion as to the "honesty" of the distinction. See the opinions of the
divided court in Albert Miller & Co. v. Corte, 207 F. (2d) 432 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939).
28. Thus, if proceedings were still pending, the Federal courts would reverse, and
if not, the original decision would simply be overruled.

§ 3,

I. Dower was abolished in Pennsylvania by the Intestate Act of 1917 P. L. 429,
PA. STAT. ANN.

(Purdon, 1930)

tit. 20,

§ 32.

Dower, until it was eliminated by statute represented a widow's life interest
in one third of the real estate of her husband. The Wills Act of 1917, P. L. 403,
§ 23a, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, i93o) tit. 20, § 261, and the Intestate Act, P. L. 429,
§ ia, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 20, § I provided that a surviving spouse who
elected to take under the intestate act instead of under the will, shall be entitled to
2.

such interests in the real and personal property of the deceased spouse as if he had

died intestate, which would have enabled the surviving spouse to take an absolute
interest in at least one third of the property.
In most jurisdictions inchoate dower has been replaced by statutory provisions.
For a complete catalogue of statutory provisions in the various states, see 3 VERNIER,
AmERICAN FAMILY LAWS (I935) §§ I88, i89; see Note (937) 46 YALE L. J. 884.
3. Only three cases were cited on point on the question of a presumption of
fraud. Baird v. Stearne, i5 Phila. 339 (1882) ; Duncan's Appeal, 43 Pa. 67 (1862) ;
Robinson v. Buck, 71 Pa. 386 (2872).

The latter two cases involved conveyances by

a wife. Sharswood, J. said in the last case ". . . the execution of a deed without
consideration on the morning of her marriage, was prima facie in fraud of the intended husband, and devolved upon those claiming under the deed the onus of showing
that it was communicated to him." Id. at 392.
Pennsylvania has also cast aside the presumption in cases of personal property.
Beirne v. Continental-Equitable Trust Co., 307 Pa. 570, i6i At. 721 (1932). See a
criticism of the case. Legis. (i934) 8 TEMP. L. Q. 531.
4. Wallace v. Wallace, 137 Iowa 269, 124 N. V. 913 (I9O8); Ward v. Ward, 63
Ohio St. 225, 57 N. E. 1095 (i9oo). For a complete discussion and a list of cases, see
I TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2nd ed. 1920) § 220, n. 63; I THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY
(124) § 829.

The American rule of presumption has an anomalous history. In England the
courts recognized a presumption of fraud in antenuptial conveyances made by the
wife, but never granted any reciprocal protection to a wife's dower interest. Yet this
English rule is relied on in America as authority for protection against antenuptial
conveyances in fraud of dower. The leading American case is Chandler v. Hollingsworth, 3 Del. Ch. 99 (2867) which is cited almost without exception in all jurisdictions
where the presumptive rule has been applied. The result is justified because there has
never been any marriage settlement in this country.
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evidence of intent to prejudice the right of dower,5 and the burden was
upon the grantee to prove the validity of the deed. An exception to this
conveyance rule was recognized in some states, though not in Pennsylvania,6 where the deed was made to children of prior marriage.7 Such is
still the rule in several jurisdictions where statutes abolished, but substantially emulated the rules of common law dower.8 The general trend of the
cases has, however, been toward a rule in which actual fraud must be
proved." A surviving spouse must show that the conveyance was made in
contemplation of marriage, that representation of ownership was made as
inducement to marry, that conveyance was concealed, and that she had no
knowledge thereof. 10 Although the wife proves a conveyance made in
breach of faith, if such was made to children of former marriage where
moral obligation existed, an exception similar to the older rule is made."1
Since a wife still has a contingent interest in her husband's property it is
desirable to protect that interest. On the other hand the practical tendency
in the law is to permit free alienation of property. The two guiding principles are, in their extremes, diametrically opposed. It seems logical that
no presumption of fraud should be raised to protect an interest in the
prospective wife which is neither present nor certain, especially in cases
where there is a moral obligation of support to children of a prior marriage.
The rule of free alienation in the absence of actual fraud in the instant situation, therefore, appears to be a sound one.
Judgments-Lack of Due Process in Class Suit against a
Stranger-Plaintiffs sued in Illinois to enjoin certain property owners
from violating a restrictive covenant forbidding the use or ownership of
their premises by Negroes, the covenant to be effective when signed by
the owners of ninety-five per cent. of the frontage involved. Defendants
pleaded that the owners of only fifty-four per cent. of the frontage had
5."Such a presumption appears to be reinforced by the fact that the particular
conveyance is so framed, or the circumstances are such that the grantor will still enjoy
the use of the property for the term of his life." I TIFFANY, op. Cit. supra note 4,
§22o, n. 63.
6. Baird v. Stearne, 15 Phila. 339 (I882), is generally referred to as the leading
case on this point.
7. Beechley v. Beechley, 134 Iowa 75, io8 N. W. 762 (19o6); Fennessey v.
Fennessey, 84 Ky. 519, 2 S. W. 159 (1886). Contra: Ward v. Ward, 63 Ohio St. 125,
57 N. E. 1o95 (I9OO). See I THomPsoN, op. cit. supra note 4.

8. Daniher v. Daniher,

201

Ill. 489, 66 N. E. 239

(1903) ;

cf. Jarvis v. Jarvis, 286

(1919). 3 VERNIER, op. cit. supra note 2.
9. Nelson v. Brown, 164 Ala. 397, 51 So. 360 (91o) ; Harrison v. Harrison, i98
Ark. 64, 127 S.W. (2d) 270 (1939); Griffin v. Griffin, 225 Mich. 253, 196 N. W. 384
(923).
In the instant case the court said "either spouse may challenge, as fraudulent,
Ill.
478, 122 N. E.

121

a conveyance of real estate . . . made during a treaty of marriage, but mere proof
of the conveyance or gift, without the knowledge of the other party does not constitute a prima facie case of fraudulent transfer. In addition it is necessary to prove
fraud, or actual fraud. . . . Mere conjecture or suspicion does not take the place of
evidence. . .

."

Accord: Tracy v. Thatcher, I35 Kan. 615, 'I P. (2d) 69I (1932);

Kavenaugh v. Kavenaugh, 279 Mass. 238, 181 N. E. I8I (1932).
io. These requisites are evident from the cases which have been set forth.
Similar rules are found in two other notes. See Note (927) 1I MINN. L. REv. 354,
361; (935) 20 CORN. L. Q. 381. Much discussion has been aroused as to the relative
meanings of "in contemplation of marriage" and "on the eve of marriage".
It is also to be noted that a few cases have extended the rule to declare a conveyance voidable where the prospective husband has not yet selected the intended
wife, but has nevertheless transferred his property in contemplation of his subsequent
marriage. Beechley v. Beechley, 134 Iowa 75, io8 N. W. 762 (I9O6).
ii. Beechley v. Beechley, cited note 9, supra; Sederland v. Sederland, 176 Wis.
627, 187 N. W. 750 (1922). Contra: Ward v. Ward, 63 Ohio St. 125, 57 N. E. io95
(1900).
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signed the agreement, rendering it ineffective. Plaintiffs replied by setting up a judgment in a previous suit by a property owner "on behalf of
herself and all other property owners in the district covered and affected
by the agreement," in which the court had enjoined the Negroes' use of
the premises, the parties there having stipulated that owners of ninetyfive per cent. had signed.' The state court found that in fact only fiftyfour per cent. had signed, but since the question of due execution was resolved in the previous "class" suit it was res adjudicata and the injunction
should be granted.2 Held, it is a violation of due process to hold the parties bound by the judgment rendered in the earlier litigation to which they
were not parties. Hansberry v. Lee, 9 U. S. L. WEEK 4o16 (U. S.
1940).3

The doctrine of class representation is well recognized in equity practice,4 for the Fourteenth Amendment does not compel state courts to
adopt any particular rule for establishing the conclusiveness of judgments
in class suits. 5 Further, the general dogma is that the law of the forum
dictates as to just what a class suit is, and who are members of that class.8
At first sight, therefore, the Supreme Court would appear to be bound by
the holding of the Illinois court that the defendants in the instant case
were in privity with the original defendants. This is so unless the litigants were, at the time of rendition, subject to the jurisdiction of the
court,7 i. e., unless the holding deprives the parties of a right protected
by the Constitution." The fact that the present defendants had no notice
of the prior suit, 9 and that the state court found as a fact that only fiftyfour per cent. of the owners had signed the agreement shows that the
present defendants were not adequately represented. The Court argued that
the parties were not necessarily members of the same class merely because
they all had signed the same agreement. While this is not too convincing,
it appears that these facts would coincide with one of the three types of
class suits outlined in the new Federal Rules, namely, "spurious class
suits", 10 where judgments are held to bind only the parties actually before
i. Burke v. Kleiman, 277 Ill. App. 519 (1934).
Lee v. Hansberry, 372 Ill. 369, 24 N. E. (2d) 37 (1939).

2.

Two justices dis-

sented. For an excellent criticism of the case in the Illinois court, see Note (1939)
49 YALE L. J. 1123.
3. Mr. Justice Stone delivered the opinion of the Court.
4. Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255 U. S. 356 (192i) ; Hartford Life Ins.
Co. v. Ibs, 237 U. S. 662 (915); i FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) § 436. See
also Blume, The "Coinon Questions" Principle in the Code Provision.for Representative Suits (1932) 30 MIcH. L. REv. 878; Wheaton, Representative Suits Involving
Numerous Litigants (1934) I9 CORN. L. Q. 399.
5. Avery v. Alabama, 308 U. S. 444 (i939); United Gas Public Service Co. v.
Texas, 303 U. S. 123 (1938) ; Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (936).
6. Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U. S. I (1912);
RESTATEMENT, CoNrx.icr OF LAWS (1934) § 450, comment d; GooDRIcH, CoNFucr OF
LAWS (1938) 553.
7. The Court in the instant case relied heavily on the fact that notice was never
given to the present defendants of the previous suit. It would seem more a question
of whether their interests were actually represented and protected in the lawsuit as required by the due process clause.
8. Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34 (1893) ; "If then, a state court gives effect to a
judgment rendered in the same state, which judgment is a nullity for want of jurisdiction, the party aggrieved may take the case to the Supreme Court of the United States
upon writ of error." Abbot, Res Judicata as a Federal Question (1912) 25 HALv. L.

REv. 443, 448.

9. Lee v. Hansberry, 372 111. 369, 24 N. E. (2d) 37, 41 (939).
IO. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure define three types of representative

actions. These are founded on whether the right sought is (i) joint, common or secondary, (2) several, and the action concerns claims to specific property, or (3) several,
and there is a common question of law or fact and a common relief is sought. This
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the court. 1 Inherent in the argument of the Court was the fear, through
this opportunity of collusive litigation, of destroying the rights of parties
not before the court.1 2 If that is the real basis for holding the judgment
not binding, a clearer definition of the departure from due process would
be desirable.
Labor Law-Authority of N. L. R. B. to Order Payment of Work
Relief Deductions to Governmental Agency-In ordering reinstatement of discharged employees, with back pay, the Board required employer
to deduct and pay over to the appropriate governmental agency any monies
received by these employees for work performed upon any work relief
project. Held, (two justices dissenting). The provision requiring payment to governmental agencies was beyond the Board's authority. Republic Steel Corporationv. National Labor Relations Board, 9 U. S. L. Week
4019 (U. S. 1940).1
The authorities upholding the validity of provisions in back pay
orders requiring payments to governme-ntal agencies have done so with
little or no discutsion. 2 And even: thdgh those holding the provision
invalid have made a more searching ,analysis, they have not always followed the same line of reasoniryg.3- Under section IO (c) of the Act the
Board is empowered, inter alia, ". . . to take such affirmative action, including reinstatement with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this Act." 4 In so far as all back pay orders are punitive the polilast type is called a "spurious class suit". The instant case would undoubtedly fall
within this class.

See NOTES TO THE RULEs OF CiviL PROCEDURE FOR THE DisTRICT
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES (1938) 22; 2 MooREs FEDERAL PRicTIcE (1938) 223522452241, 2283, 2294.
II. 2 MooREs'S FEDERAL PRACTICE

The author has drafted
(1938)
a rule declaring that judgments in suits of this last type should bind only the parties
actually before the court.

12. "Apart from the opportunities it would afford for the fraudulent and collusive

sacrifice of the rights of absent parties, we think the representation in this case no more
satisfies the requirements of due process than a trial by a judicial officer who is in such
situation that he may have an interest in the outcome of the litigation in conflict with
that of the litigants." Instant case at 408.
I. The opinion of the circuit court can be found in 107 F. (2d) 472 (C. C. A. 3d,
The Board's original order can be found in 9 N. L. R. B. 219 (1938). See
comments on the instant case in (940) 39 MicH. L. REv. 328; and in (1941) 5o YALE
L. J. 507.
2. N. L. R. B. v. Somerset Shoe Co., III F. (2d) 681 (C. C. A. Ist, 1940) (This
provision approved without discussion) ; Union Drawn Steel Corp. v. N. L. R. B., lO9
F. (2d) 587 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940) (Cites and approves the Republic case infra without
discussion); Republic Steel Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 107 F. (2d) 472 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939)
(Holds the provision valid as being within the discretionary power of the board and
not unreasonable-cites the Planterscase infra as authority.) ; N. L. R. B. v. Planters
Mfg. Co., Inc., 105 F. (2d) 750 (C. C. A. 4th, 1939) (Provision approved without discussion).
3. M. H. Ritzwoller Co. v. N. L. R. B., 114 F. (2d) 432 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940);
N. L. R. B. v. Waumbec Mills, Inc., 114 F. (2d) 226 (C. C. A. Ist, 1940) ; Phelps
Dodge Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 113 F. (2d) 202 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) ; Stewart Die Casting
Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 2 Labor Cases 909 (C. C. A. 7th, 194o) (An excellent discussion
holding in general that it is not within the discretionary authority of the Board.);
N. L. R. B. v. Tovrea Packing Corp., III F. (2d) 626 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940) (Holds
that the authority of the Board is limited to a decision whether a back pay order should
or should not be made.) ; N. L. R. B. v. Leviton Mfg. Co., Inc., Ill F. (2d) 61g (C. C.
A. 2d, 1940) (Provision held to be punitive and hence invalid). Accord, N. L. R. B.
v. J. Greenebaum Tanning Co., iio F. (2d) 984 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940) (Refusing reimbursement for union dues secured through a check-off practice where it would not
directly effectuate the policies of the Act.).
4. 49 STAT. 454 (I935), 29 U. S. C. A. § i6o (e) (Supp. 1939).
1939).
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the employer is concerned, 5 the power of the Board to order an employer
to make these payments to governmental agencies should not be denied or
permitted by conveniently labelling the order punitive or remedial 6 depending on the indeterminable argument over the nature of work relief,7 but
should be tested by a determination whether the Board has acted within
the scope of the authority granted to it by this section of the Act. There
are two possible constructions of section io-(c). 8 One view is that the
discretionary authority of the Board is limited to a decision whether, in
order to effectuate the policies of the Act, a reinstated employee shall or
shall not receive back pay.9 Under this view the provision for payment
of any deductions is clearly beyond the authority specifically granted to
the Board.' 0 The other is that the scope of the Board's discretionary authority is to be found in the broader power to take affirmative action, the
only limitation being the provision that such action must effectuate the
policies of the Act." In so far as the payment of the deduction to the
governmental agencies does not directly affect or protect the employee's
right of collective bargaining 12 and is not necessary to make the employee
5. A back pay order is a total loss as far as the employer is concerned for he is
forced to pay out moneys to employees without getting the benefit of their services.
6. See for an exposition and analysis of the dual characteristics of back pay orders
Note (1939) 48 YA.E L. J. 1265. The use of the terms punitive or remedial is to be
found in a dictum in Consolidated Edison Co. v. N. L. R. B., 305 U. S. I97, 236 (1938)
(It was held that the Board did not have jurisdiction over a non-litigating union to
enable them to set aside a contract made by that union. Like the instant case, it was
a problem of jurisdiction and not one based on the question whether the order was
punitive or remedial.). See also N. L. R. B. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F. (2d) 862
(C. C. A. 2d, 1938), cert. denied, 304 U. S. 576 (1938), 304 U. S. 585 (,938) (also
could have been decided on other grounds than whether the order was punitive or
remedial). In the instant case the majority opinion seeks to rationalize the opinion
on this ground, while the dissent, however, points out the weakness of the device. See
also Goldstein, Effectuating the Policies of the National Labor Relations Act (194o)
20 B. U. L. REv. 74.
7. The majority opinion in the instant case first states that there is no finding to
the effect that the W. P. A. does not get a quid pro quo for the wages paid; then it
assumes the theory of the Board that the governmental agency does suffer a loss and
discusses the power of the Board to make such an order from that assumption. See
Boldemann Chocolate Co., 13 N. L. R. B. 1281 (I939), 53 H.Av. L. REV. 141 (Showing the difference of opinion as to the nature of work relief).
8. 49 STAT. 454 (i935), 29 U. S. C. A. § i6o (c) (Supp. I939).
9. N. L. R. B. v. Tovrea Packing Corp., iii F. (2d) 626 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940).
The problem as to whether or not a deduction from back pay order will or will not
effectuate the policies of the Act is not in issue here. See Note (1939) 48 YALE L. J.
1265, at I27I. The theory of the Board as to deductions is generally similar to commonlaw mitigation of damages.
io. See N. L. R. B. v. Carlisle Lumber Co., 99 F. (2d) 533, 537 (C. C. A. 9th.
1938), cert. denied, 304 U. S. 575 (938), 3o6 U. S. 646 (I939) (Held that a back pay
order could not be granted without reinstatement, thus confining the Board's authority
to the reinstatement clause.). Compare this case with Mooresville Cotton Mills v.
N. L. R. B., 97 F. (2d) 959 (C. C. A. 4 th, 1938).
ir. Stewart Die Casting Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 2 Labor Cases gog (C. C. A. 7th,
1940). See also N. L. R. B. v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 3o6 U. S. 240 (1938).
The language in this case supports the view that the back pay remedy finds its source
in the broad power to take affirmative action. Note (I939) 48 YALE L. J. 1265, at 1270.
12. 49 STAT. 449 (I935), 29 U. S. C. A. § 15I et seq. (Supp. 1939) (§ 1 of the Act
declares it to be the policy of the United States to eliminate obstructions to commerce
caused by labor disputes by encouraging the practice of collective bargaining and guaranteeing workers full freedom of association.). "In construing the National Labor
Relations Act, it is necessary to always bear in mind that its constitutionality is based
solely on the Commerce Clause having no independent power to regulate the relations between employer and employee . . . the chances of sustaining its constitutionality were
remote, unless its scope were restricted to such employer-employee relations as could
be demonstrated to have a fairly direct effect in obstructing interstate commerce. It
is wholly unreasonable to assume a purpose on the part of either of the draftsmen or
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whole,1 3 it is submitted, under either view, the instant decision is correct
in holding that the Board acted beyond its authority. 14 Nor should the
deterrent effect on the employer of the cost of reimbursing the governmental agencies be enough, without more, to say that such an order will
effectuate the policies of the Act.' 5 If Congress had intended that the

Board have authority to provide for compensation of these governmental
agencies 16 in order to effectuate a broader policy as to unemployment, it
might be well have said so specifically. 7 Moreover, the power of the

appropriate governmental agency to accept payments without legislative
authority to do so is questionable.'

Procedure-Effect of Real Party in Interest Rule on Pleading
Defendant's Insurance-Plaintiff and his subrogated insurance company as additional plaintiff averred in their statement of claim that defendant was protected by property damage insurance. Defendant moved to
strike the statement on the grounds that the allegation would bring defendant's insurance to the jury's attention and thereby prejudice his
rights. Held, that defendant's motion should be denied where, as here,
plaintiff was also insured. Wolf et al. v. Gross, 38 D. & C. 413 (C. P.
Pa. 194o).
Plaintiff, seeking recovery for personal injuries, and his subrogated
insurance company, seeking recovery for the property damages," alleged
that defendant was protected by public liability and property damage insurance. Defendant moved to strike the statement of claim on the grounds
mentioned above. Held, that the allegation was improper, being irrelevant
and prejudicial, but that defendant's rule must be discharged for failure
to file within the prescribed period. 2 Goodwin et al. v. Scott, Phila. Legal
Intelligencer, Dec. 3, 1940, P. 1, col. 4 (C. P. Phila., Pa. 194o).
of Congress to extend its scope beyond that declared." Drinker, The Right to Discharge Employees for Union Activity (194o) 88 U. oF PA. L. Rev. 8o6, at 8o7. See
also his discussion at 8o8 and 815.
13. Stewart Die Casting Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 2 Labor Cases 909 (C. C. A. 7th,
194o). In N. L. R. B. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F. (2d) 862 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938),
cert. denied, 304 U. S. 576 (1938), 304 U. S. 585 (1938), the court observed that the
power granted in § IO(c) was remedial and designed to enable the Board to restore
the status quo between employer and employee and that further than that the Board
could not go. Drinker, op. cit. supra note 12, at 815, who says that while § io(c)
confers on the Board discretion to determine what affirmative action is necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act, it certainly gives the Board no discretion to determine what those policies are.
14. (1940) 39 MicHi. L. REV. 328. See for analogy N. L. R. B. v. J. Greenebaum
Tanning Co., Iio F. (2d) 984 (C. C. A. 7th, 194o).
I5. (940) 40 Col. L. REv. 1272, at 1274. The dissent in the instant case thought
that the deterrent effect is enough. That if allowed, the limit of the deterrent would
be the amount of the back pay order.
16. Assuming that work relief is essentially a relief device.
17. It is difficult to assume that Congress intended such jurisdiction.
18. See Stewart Die Casting Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 2 Labor Cases 909, 916 (C. C.
A. 7th, 1940). The Court there observed that even if the Board had jurisdiction, this
order would be an unreasonable exercise of that discretion in that an employer would
have no way of knowing which if any of the numerous governmental agencies should
be paid, particularly in so far as the funds for work relief are usually supplied by more
than one and sometimes numerous agencies.
I. Plaintiff insurance company had no interest at all in plaintiff Goodwin's claim
for personal injuries, having been subrogated only to the claim for property damage.
2. Defendant failed to file his motion, within the fifteen-day period prescribed by
§21 of the Pa. Practice Act of 1915, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 12, § 491,
and by Rule 55 of the Courts of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County.
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Prior to the adoption of Pennsylvania's new real party in interest

rule 3 neither of the above statements of claim could have been approved,
the rule against alleging or proving, directly or indirectly, defendant's in4
surance in a personal injury or death action having been well established.
It is contended, however, that adoption of the real party rule has altered
the situation because plaintiff's insurance company, as subrogee and real
party in interest, must now be joined as plaintiff.5 The Wolf case is an
obvious attempt to equalize the prejudices by permitting defendant's insurance to be shown when plaintiff is also insured. 6 The court in the Goodwin case, however, disapproved of the holding of the Wolf case on the
grounds that it is hard to justify the logic of concluding that an allegation,
always held to be irrelevant, is made relevant by the joinder of an insurance company as plaintiff.7 The reasoning of the Goodwin case, in turn,
may be criticized on the ground that the rule against showing defendant's
insurance was adopted not fundamentally because the existence of protective insurance was irrelevant, but because of the policy in favor of protecting the defendant against unfair prejudice.8 When the policy falls,
3. PA. RULES Civ. PROC., Rule 2002, 332 Pa. lxxiii (1939), adopted Feb. 14,
1939, to become effective Sept. 4, 1939. For general treatment of the rule, see Note
(1940) 89 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 218.
4. The question usually arises over the admission of evidence at the trial. Kaplan v. Loev, 327 Pa. 465, 194 Atl. 653 (1937); Hollis v. United States Glass Co.,

Pa. 49, 69 Atl. 55 (19o8) ; Scranton Gas & Water Co. v. Weston, 63 Pa. Super.
57o (1916). But where defendant calls the witness, plaintiff may bring out on crossexamination defendant's insurance as matter tending to show the witness' interest
or bias and thus attack his credibility. Lenahan v. Pittston Coal Mining Co., 221
Pa. 626, 70 Atl. 884 (19o8) ; cf. Batdorff v. Farmers' Nat'l Bk. of Reading, 61 Pa.
And defendant cannot object to
179 (1869) ; Ott v. Houghton, 30 Pa. 451 (858).
evidence of his insurance when such evidence is elicited in response to one of his
own questions. Ellsworth v. Lauth, 311 Pa. 286, 166 Atl. 855 (933).
The same rules with similar modifications are almost universally adopted. Notes
(1928) 56 A. L. R. 1418, (1931) 74 A. L. R. 849, (1935) 95 A. L. R. 388, (1936) lO5
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A. L. R. 1319.

However, an allegation in the pleadings that defendant is insured was held

properly stricken in Seleine v. Wisner, 2oo Iowa 1389, 2o6 N. W. 13o (1925);
Stroman v. Hooper Const. Co., 17, S. C. 393, 172 S. E. 417 (933) ; Gadsen v.
Catawba Power Co., 71 S. C. 340, 5I S. E. 121 (1904); and, in Armstrong v. Bow-

man, 21 Tenn. App. 673, 115 S. W. (2d) 229 (1938), but problems raised by the
real party in interest rule were not involved.
5. Prior to Sept. 4, 1939, plaintiff was not required to disclose that he had been

paid insurance inasmuch as all actions were instituted in the name of the party having the common law legal right of action. Requirement under the real party in
interest rule that all actions be brought in the name of the beneficial owner of the
cause of action directs the joinder of subrogated insurance companies as plaintiffs.
Note (1940)

89 U. OF PA. L. REV. 218, and authority there cited.

Application of

the rule against showing defendant's insurance put defendant in the same status
before the jury as plaintiff prior to the real party rule. Subsequent to the real party
rule, application of the rule against showing defendant's insurance prejudices plaintiff.
6. See quotation from the opinion of the Goodwin case, Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Dec. 3, 1940, p. I, col. 5 (C. P. Phila., Pa. i94o).
7. Id. at col. 4.
8. Admission of evidence harmlessly irrelevant would not constitute grounds for
reversal. Steinberg v. Levy, 139 Misc. 453, 248 N. Y. Supp. 642 (i93i); Nasmie
Const. Co. v. Quasman, 215 App. Div. 724, 212 N. Y. Supp. 391 (1925) ; see Michigan Alkali Co. v. Bankers Indemnity Ins. Co., 20 F. Supp. 424, 425 (S. D. N. Y.
1937); Rudolph Wurlitzer Co. v. Kaufman-Straus Co., 273 Ky. 149, 152, 116 S. W.

(2d) 305, 3o6 (1938); Broderick v. Horvatt, 149 Misc. 731, 734, 266 N. Y. Supp.
341, 344 (933); Town of Wadesboro v. Coxe, 215 N. C. 708, 710, 2 S. E. (2d)
876, 877 (1939); Adams v. Portage Irr., Reservoir & Power Co., 95 Utah 1,9, 72
P. (2d) 648, 651 (1937). Evidence concerning defendant's insurance is more than

irrelevant and is made grounds for reversal because actually prejudicial to the defendant. See cases cited in note 4 supra. "This court must take cognizance of the
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as here (because application of the rule will in effect work a prejudice

against the insured plaintiff),9 the rule should fall. 10 The decision of the
Wolf case thus seems proper, but the problem of the Goodwin case, where
plaintiff is only partially insured, remains unanswered. It follows from
the holding of the Wolf case that plaintiffs should be permitted to plead
the insurance which protects defendant insofar as recovery by the plaintiff insurance company is concerned, and not the insurance which protects defendant insofar as recovery by the individual plaintiff is concerned.
There is, however, nothing to avoid the prejudice which will result when
an insured plaintiff sues an uninsured defendant,'1 except, of course, plaintiff's having his insurance company withhold payment until satisfaction of
any judgment plaintiff might obtain. 2 The alternative of using "loan reavoid subrogating the insurance company is of doubtful effecceipts" to
13
tiveness.
general recognition . . . of the harmful effect upon the minds of jurors of such
testimony as was here sought to be introduced. The only purpose for which such
evidence is presented is to prejudice the jury, and the poison is of such character
that, once being injected into the mind, it is difficult of eradication. . . . Verdicts
cannot be relieved of the danger of criticism as long as there is a basis for the
opinion that they have been rendered through the influence of prejudice." James
Stewart & Co. v. Newby, 266 Fed. 287, 295 (C. C. A., 4th, i92o) ; Brown v. Walter,
62 F. (2d) 798, 8oo (C. C. A. 2d, 1933) ; Patterson v. Surpless, IO7 N. J. L. 305,
307, 308, 151 Atl. 754, 756 (I93O).
9. See note 5 supra.
io. At least, the policy of avoiding prejudices should take precedence over the
policy of avoiding irrelevant side issues. Defendant's insurance should therefore be
shown to prevent the prejudice which would result from its exclusion even though
a side issue is thereby admitted.
ii.Sisson v. Hassett, I55 Misc. 667, 28o N. Y. Supp. 148 (Sup. Ct. 1935) ; see
Seman v. West Penn Railways Co., Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Nov. 27, 1940, p. I,col. 2
(C. P. Fayette, Pa. 194o).
12. As was done in Inman v. South Carolina Ry. Co., 129 U. S. 128 (1889).
13. In Roos v. Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co., igg Pa. 378, 49 Atl. 344 (igoi),
advancement was made by the insurance company to the insured by means of a
"loan" to be repaid only in the event of and to the extent of a recovery by the insured from the wrongdoer. The trial judge left the question of whether this
amounted to a payment or a loan to the jury, and the jury's finding that a payment
had been made was sustained on appeal. In the Roos case, however, the insurance
company was attempting to escape subrogation to avoid an agreement between insured
and wrongdoer that any insurance should inure to the benefit of the wrongdoer. There
is an intimation that such an advancement will be considered a payment in Pennsylvania in the instant situation. Direct authority for the proposition that this type
of an advancement will not relieve the insurance company from becoming a real
party in interest, and therefore a necessary party, is the recent New York City
Court case, Scarborough v. Bartholomew, 2z N. Y. S. (2d) 635 (1940), 89
U. OF PA. L. REv. 395; and Simpson v. Hartrauft, I57 Misc. 387, 283 N. Y. Supp.
754 (Sup. Ct. 1935). A directly contrary result was reached in Buffalo Foundry &
Mach. Co. v. S. M. Frank & Co., I7I Misc. 999, 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 327 (Sup. Ct.
1938) ; Ash v. Rhodes, 5 N. Y. S. (2d) 939 (City Ct. 1938) ; Adler v. Bush Terminal Co., I6I Misc. 509, 291 N. Y. Supp. 435 (Sup. Ct. 1936) ; Zaidens v. Salter, i42
Misc. 439, 254 N. Y. Supp. 602 (City Ct. 1932) ; Lee v. Barrett, 82 Misc. 475, 144
N. Y. Supp. 941 (City CL 1913); see Judd v. New York & T. S. S. Co., 117 Fed.
2o6, 213 (C. C. A. 3d, 1902).
The question of whether or not a "loan receipt" advancement is a "payment"
in cases where the decision involves releasing the wrongdoer from liability to the
extent of insurance coverage (the situation of the Roos case, supra) should be distinguished. The courts almost universally refuse to denominate the loan transaction
a payment where such a decision would so relieve the wrongdoer. Luckenbach v.
W. J. McCahan Ref. Co., 248 U. S. 139 (I918); Bradley v. Lehigh Valley R. Co.,
153 Fed. 350 (C. C. A. 2d, 19o7) ; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Burr, 33o Fed. 847 (C.
C. A. 2d, 19o4); Kalle & Co. v. Morton, I56 App. Div. 522, 141 N. Y. Supp. 374
(1913) ; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Zimmerman, 81 Tex. 605, 17 S. W. 239 (I89I).
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Taxation-Liability of Donor for Income Accruing upon Chose
in Action after Transfer-Donor detached coupons from certain bonds
before maturity, and made an absolute gift of these coupons to his son,
who listed them in his income tax for that year. Held (three justices
dissenting), that the coupons at maturity were taxable to the donor as
income under Section 22 of the Revenue Act of 1934. Helvering v.
Horst, 9 U. S. L. WEEK 4032 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
Life insurance agent, after the termination of his agency contracts,
assigned absolutely certain renewal commissions to become payable to
him for services rendered under the prior contracts. Held (three justices
dissenting), that the commissions were taxable to the assignor as income
under Section 22 of the Revenue Act of 1932. Helvering v. Eubank,
9 U. S. L. WEEK 4034 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
Section 22 of the Revenue Act fails to lay down any standard that
can be followed in determining what is income.' As the courts were
forced to interpret the legislative intent, certain factors were emphasized
in determining whether or not income was realized. Receipt of cash was,
of course, obvious. Satisfaction of a legal obligation, or a saving, by
directing that the income be paid to a creditor rather than his debtor was
likewise held to be taxable. 2 Control over earnings, even though the use
of them had been contracted away, was included in the courts' interpretation of income 3; and this element of control was extended to the revocable
trust device, 4 on the theory that failure to relinquish control was paramount to actual use and receipt of the income and hence taxable. This
concept was further extended to the irrevocable trust situation where the
income was directed to the payment of insurance premiums. 5 While this
seemed to stretch the control element beyond its original application,"
there were here two other factors. The Court stressed the fact the insurance was payable to the settlor's dependents, and that he, by this device,
discharged his obligations to them. 7 In addition there was the very important fact that the Court was faced with a special provision of the
Revenue Act covering this exact situation.8 In other words, Congress
had said that income applied in this way should be taxable, and the Court
felt that this was not so arbitrary as to be unconstitutional.9 It appeared,
therefore, from these cases that there were certain standards, certain tests
i. The Act merely states that gross income shall include all gains, profits, and
income derived from earnings, interest, and other sources. 48 STAT. 68o, 686, 26

U. S. C. A.

§22

(932).

Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U. S. 716 (1929); cf. U. S. v.
Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U. S. I (i93i).
2.

3. Lucas v. Earl,

(1932),

281 U. S. in (3930) ; cf. Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U. S. 336
which came up under § 218 (a) of the Revenue Acts of i918 and I92I,

taxing the distributive share of partners.
4. Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U. S. 376 (i93o). The Court also emphasized that
this device seemed to be used solely for the purpose of escaping the tax. While this
should not be a basis for any decision, it often plays an important part.
5. Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 670 (i933).
6. Lucas v. Earl, 283 U. S. i (930).
The importance of control in the
Lucas case lay in the fact that the taxpayer could stop work, and thus put an end
to the earnings. In the Wells case the control rested merely in setting up the irrevocable trust.
7. "The relation between the parties, the tendency of the transfer to give relief
from obligations that are recognized as binding by normal men and women, will be
facts to be considered." 289 U. S. 67o, 682 (i933).

8. Section
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(h) of the Revenue Acts of

1924

and i926.

9. The strong dissent emphasized the legal fact of ownership in the trustee and
the irrelevancy of the purpose to which the income was applied. 289 U. S. 670,
683-5 (0933).
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that the Court would apply in deciding that A should be taxed for income
received by B.' 0 The instant cases, however, go beyond this traditional
approach. The basis for the majority opinions is simple in the extreme.
Since money is only valuable when it can be enjoyed, and since this right
to receive money was disposed of in a way that brought enjoyment, that
disposal was equivalent to the receipt of the money." Therefore, an
income tax should be paid. This is not only an ingenious argument, it is
one which seemed to be repudiated in Blair v. Commissioner." While
that case involved a trust, the argument of the instant cases would appear
to dictate a contrary result."1 From the standpoint of the taxing statute
and the cases interpreting it, therefore, these cases would appear to be
unprecedented. There is the further complication that there is no logical
limit to this argument. If the holder of the bonds gave away coupons
maturing in ten years, he would be taxed in that year for the benefit or
enjoyment he received, measured by the full amount of the coupons. If
the Court does restrict the application of this principle, it will be forced
to pick an arbitrary limit that has little foundation in fact or reason. The
same situation has already arisen in the short term trust situation. 14 It
would have been much simpler and more logical to have admitted that
these cases were not covered by the Act, and then await the action of
Congress. If the definition of income is to be extended this far, it is more
in the province of Congress to say so than in that of the courts. 15
Torts-Liability of County for Fire Aggravated by Blocking
County Road-A statute permits recovery against a county for damages received by reason of its negligence in not keeping county roads in
proper repair.' The petition alleges that open ditches were left across a
road by the county so that fire engines, responding to a call to plaintiff's
dwelling, were unable to pass, the dwelling being in consequence destroyed. 2 Judgment was for the defendant on a general demurrer to the
For a further discussion of these tests see Note (1937) 22 IowA L. REV. 390.
ii. "The power to dispose of income is the equivalent of ownership of it. The

1O.

exercise of that power to procure the payment of income to another is the enjoyment
and hence realization of the income by him who exercises." 9 U. S. L. WEEK 4032,
4032-33 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
12. 300 U. S. 5 (1937).
13. In both cases the one who had the right to the income disposed of it irrevo-

cably.
14. Helvering v. Wood, 6o Sup. Ct. 551 (1940) and Helvering v. Clifford, 6o
Sup. Ct. 554 (1940). When the Supreme Court, for reasons of policy, departs from
well-recognized principles, and looks into all the "considerations and circumstances"

of a case to see whether it will uphold a tax, the inevitable result will be confusion
and uncertainty. For a discussion of these cases see Ray, The Income Tax on Short
Term and Revocable Trusts

(i94o)
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HARV.

L. REY.

1322.

I5. The practical argument that no one might be forced to pay an income tax

in this situation if the donor were not forced to pay was not mentioned in the opinion, but it probably carried considerable weight.

I. "The board (of county commissioners) shall be liable in its official capacity
for damages received by reason of its negligence or carelessness in not keeping any
such road or bridge in proper repair, . . ." OHIO CODE ANN. (Throckmorton's
Baldwin, 194o) § 24o8. Such statutory waivers of county immunity are not uncommon. CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § I420, KANS. GEN. STAT. (Corrick, 1935) § 68-301,
N. Y. CONS. LAWS (Cahill, 193o) c. ii § 6. Cf. MIcH. ComP. LAws (1929) §§ 4223,
4224.2. The
ditches blocked the road some 700 feet below plaintiff's
dwelling on the
route to the town where the nearest fire department was maintained one and a half
miles away. They had been left open eleven days. Sheley v. Swing, 28 Ohio Abs.
319 (C. P. 1938).
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complaint. Held, the judgment was sustained because the statute was
intended to give a right of action only to travellers on the road, 3 and
further because the damage was not the "proximate" result of the obstruction. 4 Shely v. Swing, 29 Ohio Abs. 244, 29 N. E. (2d) 364 (i939).
The duty to another to refrain from negligent interference with a
present supply of aid actively being furnished him by a third person is
well recognized. 5 In some few jurisdictions the duty appears to have
been extended to include negligent interference with, or obstruction of,
the various avenues or conduits whereby another justifiably expects to
receive such supply of active aid in the event of a future emergency.67
But the difficulty of establishing foreseeability as to the hazard involved,
the necessary length of the causal chain 8 and, once legal cause is established, the difficulty of ascertaining the amount of damages in such cases 9
have been factors instrumental in preventing general acceptance of any
3. The Michigan statute expressly limits liability to injuries upon public highways, as to persons and vehicles. This court evidently interpreted the more general language of the Ohio statute as intended to convey that meaning. i Mic.
ComP. LAWS

(1929)

§§ 4223,

24.

4. Note that the lower court had reached its result upon bare statutory interpretation, avoiding the problems mentioned here. Sheley v. Swing, 28 Ohio Abs.
319 (C. P. 1938).

5. Metallic Compression Co. v. Fitchburg R. R., io Mass. 277 (872) ; McAdoo
v. Hanway, 135 Md. 656, io9 AtI. 446 (1925); Clark v. Grand Trunk R. R., 149
Mich. 400, 407, 112 N. W. 1121, 1124 (r9o7); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. New York Central Ry., 122 App. Div. 113, io6 N. Y. Supp. 696, aff'd ig6 N. Y. 554, 9o N. E. ri64
(i909) RESTATEMENT, TORTS (934)
§ 327. A fortiori intentional interference, Kier-

nan v. Metropolitan Const. Co., 170 Mass. 378, 49 N. E. 648 (i9o8) ; RESTATEMENT,
TORTS (1934) § 326.
6. Although possibility of a broad general rule covering all these cases has been
suggested, RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 305, liability has actually been confined
to two, or at most three, narrow types of factual situation: (a) Injury to water
mains as to risk of a future fire which does in fact occur, in which case the analogy
of water under pressure to an active supply of aid is very strong, Concordia Fire
Ins. Co. v. Simmons, 167 Wis. 541, i68 N. W. i99 (i918); Gilbert v. New Mexico
Const. Co. et al., 39 N. M. 216, 44 P. (2d) 489 (1935) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934)
§328 caveat (i). (b) Possibly, injury to telephone wires as to risk of future emergency imperilling life of another, Hodges v. Va.-Carolina Ry., 179 N. C. 566, io3
S. E. 145 (1920). But cf. Whitehead v. Carolina T. & T. Co., i9o N. C. 197, 129
S. E. 6o2 (925),

Lebanon L. & L. Tel. Co. v. Lanheim Lumber Co., 131 Ky. 718,

115 S. W. 824 (i9o9). (c) Blocking of a highway crossing by a railroad, Hanlon
Drydock and Shipbuilding Co. v. Southern Pac. Ry., 92 Cal. App. 230, 268 Pac.
385 (1928) as to risk of future fire.
7. There has been difficulty in finding such interference negligent as involving
a foreseeable unreasonable risk of harm unless there is a present knowledge of an
existing mergency. Kirstein v. P. & R. R. R., 257 Pa. 192, ioi At1. 338 (97).
See Felter v. Delaware & H. R. Corp., ig Fed. Supp. 852 (M. D. Pa., 1937) ; accord
Clark v. Grand Trunk R. R., 149 Mich. 400, 408, 112 N. W. 1121, 1124 (i97).
But see Walker v. Mo. Pac. Ry., 95 Kan. 202, I49 Pac. 677 (1915); Houren v.
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 236 Ill. 62o, 625, 86 N. E. 61i, 613 (9o8).
See RESTATE(1934) § 302 (b), comment d.
8. Hazel v. City of Owensboro, 3o Ky. L. 627, 99 S. W. 315 (907).
Compare
Luedeke v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 12o Neb. 124, 231 N. W. 695 (3930) with
Eclipse Lumber Co. v. Davis, 196 Iowa 1349, 195 N. W. 337 (1923).
But cf.
Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Tauer, 176 Ind. 621, 96 N. E. 758 (911).
In
MENT, TORTS

jurisdictions where distinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance is emphasized,
liability would be even less probable. Compare Arkansas-Louisville Ry. v. Scraggs,
i6i Ala. 97, 49 So. 399 (i9o8) with Louisville & N. R. R. v. Dpncan,, 16 Ala. App.
520, 79 So. 513 (3918). See RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) §302 (b) and comment
thereto. But see Note (3938) 23 CORN. L. Q. 349, 350.
9. See Whitehead v. Car. T. & T. Co., i9o N. C. 197, i29 S. E. 602, 604 (1925).

But see Felter v. Delaware & H. R. Corp., ig Fed Supp. 852, 855 (M. D. Pa. 1937).
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such broad rule.' 0 Liability of private or corporate persons on similar
facts would, then, be doubtful. The question of possible governmental
liability has seldom been litigated but would seem even more doubtful,:"
for where statutory waivers of immunity exist, they are strictly construed,
as in derogation of common law.' 2 The restricted scope given to the
words of the statute in the instant case was accordingly to have been expected.1 3 But the exact language of the statute, however strictly construed, might have as reasonably lent itself to a contrary interpretation 14;
and in general the commendable policy behind the scattered decisions
pointing to liability in private persons, the shifting of the heavy burden
of loss from an innocent party to him whose foreseeably dangerous conduct occasions the loss, might seem to point toward a contrary result.,
However, it is submitted that such result would be undesirable as to the
specific hazard of fire loss, for equable distribution of loss is assured
through the medium of fire insurance policies.' 6 As governmental liability is not based on any theory of personal guilt, and as expensive litigation to determine the fact of negligence is avoided by permitting the loss
to lie where it falls, the court's final determination of this problem would
seem highly satisfactory.
io.The rule enunciated in RESTATEiENT, TORTS (1934) § 328, "One, who wrongfully obstructs a highway and thereby prevents a third person from giving aid .
is liable to the other for . . . harm caused by the absence of such aid," might
seem at first blush to apply exactly to the facts of the instant case. But notice must
be taken of the peculiar connotation of the word "wrongful" as there set forth; for
in the majority of cases supporting the rule, breach of duty seems to have been
found in breach of penal statutes against blocking of crossings by railroads, in
which event the only question remaining for determination is that of causation. Delaware & H. R. Corp. v. Felter, 98 F. (2d) 868 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938) ; Houren v.
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 236 Ill. 62o, 86 N. E. 6ir (I9O8); Walker v. Mo. Pac.
Ry., 96 Kans. 702, 149 Pac. 677 (I9r5) ; see Terry v. New Orleans etc. R. R., io3
Miss. 679, 6o So. 729 (19r3). See RESTAT=ENT, TORTS, (1934) §286 (c). The
statutes might however be construed as merely crystallizing a common law duty, and
if so, "wrongful" as above used is equivalent to "negligent," and the instant case
falls within the rule. Hanlon Drydock & Shipbuilding Co. v. Southern Pac. Co.,
To the effect that this line of cases is
92 Cal. App. 230, 268 Pac. 385 (1928).
possibly an evidence of desire strictly to enforce the statute by making its breach
more burdensome rather than to allow recovery to the injured party see Note (0938)
13 IND. L. J. 418. Where them is knowledge of the emergency, it appears that liability will be found independent of statute. Globe Iron Co. v. N. Y. Central Ry.,
227 N. Y. 58, 124 N. E. io9 (igxg).
ii. As to municipal liability there are three interesting cases. Small v. City of
Frankfort, 203 Ky. 188, 261 S. W. 2222 (1924) was decided on grounds of government immunity, Hazel v. City of Owensboro, 3o Ky. L. 627, 99 S. W. 315 (Ky.
i9o7) on causation, Fleming v. Holleman, i9O N. C. 486, I3O S. E. 269 (1925) on
a statute as well as both of the above two grounds. Liability was not allowed.
12. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (2924) 34 YALE L. J. I, 9.
23. Note the language of courts as to this type of statute. See Bales v. Comm'rs,
30 Ohio App. 249, 253, 164 N. E. 791, 793 (I928); Salzman v. New Haven, 81
Conn. 393, 71 Atl. 500 (igo8).
14. No such limitation can be ascertained from the bare language of the statute.
See note i supra. Further the rule of government immunity has been sharply questioned. See Borchard, note 12 supra at i. Particularly as to counties, see id. at 41.
With respect to government liability concerning repair of roads and bridges see
id. at 229. It would seem that a liberal construction would in most cases be more
desirable.
r5. Gilbert v. New Mexico Const. Co., 39 N. M. 216, 222, 44 P. (2d) 489, 492
(1935).
See cases cited note 6 supra.
16. Gilbert v. New Mexico Const. Co., 39 N. M. 216, 228, 44 P. (2d) 489, 492
(I935) (dissenting opinion). It is a matter of common knowledge that when fire
damage in a district increases, the insurance premiums for that district rise in direct
proportion thereto. So the loss is distributed over the property owners of the community, who in the long run pay the best part of the county revenue, rather than
on the whole body of taxpayers.
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Trusts-Trustee's Duty to Diversify Investments-As trustee
administering two testamentary trusts, defendant undertook to invest in
certain first mortgages. In one estate such a mortgage comprised 50o
of the principal balance shown at the first accounting; in the other, two
first mortgages, in about equal amount, comprised over 997 of the principal.1 Subsequent to the investments the properties had depreciated considerably in value. Plaintiffs, life tenant and remainderman under both
trusts, excepted to the accounts, asking, inter alia, that credits taken for
the above mortgages be disallowed because the trustee had not properly
diversified his investments. Held, exceptions dismissed. Absent precedent or statutory direction, such investments will not be held improvident
per se for any lack of diversification. In re Saeger's Estate and Appeal
of Howell, (two cases), 340 Pa. 73, 16 A. (2d) 19 (194o).2
This is the first clear pronouncement by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania that the principle requiring a diversification of trust investments
will not be included in the broad rules designed to guide the conduct of
trustees.3 Although such a rule has long been advocated by many writers
in the legal and financial world, 4 few courts have stated it in terms of an
absolute duty.5 In the absence of statutory authority, only two jurisdictions have taken an affirmative stand on the question.6 There is an
equally small amount of statutory direction.? While experience has proved
to many investors that predictions on the basis of study of a single investment are rarely safe,8 in view of the complexities entailed in a rule such
i. The mortgage in the first estate was $25,000 out of a $54,662.45 principal; in
the second estate the mortgages were $I4,O62.76 and $I2,O61.96 out of a principal

balance of $26,86340.

2. The precedent of this decision has already had binding effect in Pennsylvania.
See Romberger's Estate, Phila. Legal Intelligencer, December 17, I94O, p. i, col. 6
(0. C. Phila. 394o).
3. Compare, however, Elkins's Estate, 325 Pa. 373, i9o At. 65o (937), where the
court, in dismissing an appeal on the ground that the time had elapsed within which an
earler adjudication might be reviewed, states in its concluding paragraph that the lower
court reached a correct result. That result was based on a repudiation of the principle
of diversification. For the well-considered lower court opinion, see Elkins' Estate, 2o
D. & C. 483 (Pa. 1934).
4. 2 ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS (1939) § 228; 3 BOGEa r, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
(I935) § 612; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 228; Neilan, The Activities of Bank
Examiners with Respect to Trust Investments (1938) 5 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB.
462, 467. For a collection of authorities in the financial world advocating diversification as a sound doctrine, see Note (1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. REv. 64o, at !. 643, n. 22.
5. Although the American Law Institute adopted the doctrine (RESTATEMENT,
TRUSTS (1935) § 228), reference to its proceedings relates that its authority was
meager. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS, EXPLANATORY NOTES (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1933) § 220,
and (933) 11 Proc. A. L. I. 169.
6. Davis, Appellant, 183 Mass. 499, 67 N. E. 6o4 (903); Dickinson, Appellant,
152 Mass. 184, 25 N. E. 99, 9 L. R. A. 279 (i8go) ; In re Ward, 121 N. J. Eq. 555, 192
Atl. 68 (1936), aff'd, 121 N. J. Eq. 6o6, 191 Atl. 772 (1937). See also, Warren v.
Pazolt, 203 Mass. 328, 89 N. E. 381 (I9O9), and for an English case, which, without
discussing the doctrine supports it on its facts, Astbury v. Beasley, 17 W. R. 638
(i869). Contra: (These several cases in the lower courts of New York have refused
to adopt the principle), see Matter of Sheldon, i6o Misc. 194, 196, 289 N. Y. Supp.
887, 89o (Surr. Ct. 1936); Matter of Balfe, 152 Misc. 739, 755-56, 274 N. Y. Supp.
284, 302 (Surr. Ct. 1935) ; Matter of Adriance, 145 Misc. 345, 352, 26o N. Y. Supp.

173, 181 (Surr. Ct. 1932).

(Baldwin, 1934) § 7909 (limits to lo% where estate exceeds
§ 320.02 (from 20% to 5o% depending on the size of the
estate). For instances of statutory direction to diversify aimed at banks, see CONN.
GEN. STAT. (3930) §§ 3995, 4003; Fed. Res. Bd., Regulation F (c) (5) (2d par.)
quoted in Capron, Federal Reserve Regulations of Common Trust Funds (1938) 5
LAW AND CONTEMP. PROa. 439, 445.
8. The contrary philosophy was expressed by the oft-quoted Andrew Carnegie,
"Put all your eggs in one basket, and watch the basket." This was repeated by the
7.

IND. STAT. ANN.

$io,ooo) ; Wis. STAT. (939)

RECENT CASES

as that argued for in the present situation, the position of the court is not
surprising.9 For example, the rigidity with which such a rule is applied
should perhaps vary according to the type of investment, the amount of
the trust estate, general business conditions, and many other factors.
While this has been recognized by those contending for the principle, 0 its
strongest proponent admits that no very definite proportion may safely be
set up as a criterion for all cases." Hence, since some of the best opinion

is in disagreement about the efficacy of the minority position, 12 perhaps

each court, operating under the familiar "common skill, common prudence,
and common caution" rule, 13 can best decide each case in the light of the
particular fact situation which governed the trustee's action. It must be
noted that even under this broad latter test, one Pennsylvania court has
given a dictum to the effect that "no sane man . . . would invest all his

means, or an undue proportion thereof, in any one class of securities; and
if he would not do so for himself, he certainly ought not so to act with
trust funds." 14 Thus, diversification may, in an extreme case, be a
matter of "common prudence". Serious difficulties already face fiduciaries
seeking to invest money under present conditions.' 5 And since courts
normally test a trustee's actions from the hindsight view, any standard
including a nearly absolute duty to even "reasonably" diversify1 6 would
logically seem to flow only from a legislative direction of a rather detailed
nature.
instant court at p. 22, quoting from Matter of Adriance, 145 Misc. 345, 352, 260 N. Y.
Supp. i73, I81 (Surr. Ct. 1932).
9.The court's position was anticipated, see Note (1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. REv.
640, 644.
io.See, for example, RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 228, comment b.
ii. "It seems, however, that no arbitrary rule of percentages of the whole fund
that may safely be held by a trustee in one form or security has been adopted in Massachusetts." North Adams National Bank v. Curtiss, 278 Mass. 471, 482, i8o N. E. 217,
222 (1932).
12. Compare,

note 7 mpra, with the opinions of the writers cited and referred to
in note 3 supra.
13. This Pennsylvania rule of the care governing fiduciaries with respect to investments was first set forth in Calhoun's Estate, 6 Watts i85, 188 (Pa. 1837). It is

the common "due care under the circumstances" test.
14. Estate of Naglee, 6 Phila. 28, 29-30 (Pa. I865).

15. See Kline, Trust Investment Under Pennsylvania Law (194o) 44 DicK. L.
REv. 69.
16. Note that the Restatement stand is worded "...
the trustee is under a duty

to the beneficiary to distribute the risk of loss by a reasonable diversification of investments, unless under the circumstances it is prudent not to do so."
RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935)

§ 228.

(Italics supplied.)

